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Abstract 
 
When both academic critique and funding criteria essentially say to political theory, ‘what is 
the point?’, anxiety creeps into the heart of every normative theorist and agonising self-
reflection ensues; the study of the political without advisory comment and application may not 
seem a legitimate use of public finances, where demands to ‘make better use’ of research (in a 
UK context at least) reveal a common tendency towards impact (Council E. a., 2017). Thus, 
our response appears urgent: not just for the standing of the subject, but for its very survival, 
for the continuation of PhD funding relies upon the quality of the reply.  
The problem is, the replies do not merely conflict, they rest upon fundamentally opposed views 
of what the subject actually is – effectively, whether or not it should be in pursuit of actual 
impact. With the premise of an impact agenda therefore set up, in this paper I intend to deliver 
three objections to a consequential ‘impact theory’, and seek to resolve those objections with 
an altered methodological approach. I hope this gives us a normative theory that can be seen 
as ‘legitimate’ in terms of being able to explicitly rise to the challenge of ‘why it should be 
funded by the taxpayer’, and ‘legitimate’ in the sense that it still retains its philosophical 
identity; that social prescription does not come at the cost of, what I believe, should be key 
elements of theorising – conceptual analysis and deep reflection.  
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In Part 1 – ‘Funding, Impact, Legitimacy, and the Current State of Theory’ - I start with a little 
story as a set-up, from which I spend the rest of the paper unpacking, but the main point here 
is to present the fact that legitimacy measured as impact is firmly on the agenda with university 
funding. After this, I explain why such funding demands ought to be brought into the debates 
within the academy between philosophy, history, normative theory and realism. Next, I give a 
brief analysis of how normative theory is currently adaptable in an impact agenda, moving 
from this to see, at first glance, how it stands up to the two main ways I believe research 
councils are measuring impact.  
Following on from this, part 2 – ‘Objection, Objection, Objection!’ - details three concerns to 
a more explicitly normative, normative theory. The objection of philosophy deals with a 
political theory that is not thought of predominantly as a ‘prescriptive’ pursuit, due to the 
concerns over the wielding of a resultant moral expertise and other related issues. Going into 
the objection of history, I connect this to a critique of normative principles and presupposition, 
yet show that such concerns leave us in a problematic position in regard to effective evaluation 
of ‘real life’ events and actors, and the power to deem certain actions desirable or not. I then 
offer the last of the doubts over a normative theory for impact; my own: an objection of method 
This however, I think, leads me into an answer to not just the methodological complaint, but 
the other two objections also. In Part 3 – ‘A Method for Legitimacy’- I propose a subtle change 
to how we approach normative theory. This offering, I believe, avoids concerns over moral 
expertise and deals with historicisation of normative principles, yet engages in conceptual 
analysis more readily than the current method of presuppositions does, at the same time as 
being able to be socially prescriptive for impact and transformation.  Perhaps a little late, I 
present how such a way of doing normative theory would look in practice, by examining how 
the work done in Jeremy Waldron’s ‘Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom’ could be 
performed with this altered approach.  
I end on a brief ‘Epilogue’, in which I consider storytelling as one framework for this new 
normative method.  
  
Part 1 – Funding, Impact, Legitimacy, and the Current State of Theory 
 
1.1 The Tower of philosophy: connecting funding to impact 
Let us start then, with the aforementioned story. On the top floor of a high-rise building, a 
group of people talk. The room they converse in is large, spacious, and full of interesting items, 
from ancient, creaking bookshelves lined with old cracked, leather bound tomes, to bottles of 
wine that appear oddly new in comparison to the furniture around (apparently though, the wine 
itself has soured). There are many people here, dressed in togas and scholarly robes. Some look 
up through the glass domed roof to the skies above, asking ethereal questions to, who is now, 
no-one in particular: the categorical spectre of a murdered god. Others focus more on each 
other, conversing animatedly. If one could overhear these exchanges, they would catch talk of 
justice, morality, and the normative.  
A few have been floating around closer to the windows - the ones that are not stained - only 
dipping into abstract discussions as they occasionally wander away from the glass panes. They 
soon seek them out again though, to gaze onto the world below with the knowledge each 
conversation gives them, rather than spending more time on arguing over that knowledge; or 
at least accepting that is a task related to the window-gazing, but to be pursued in between 
those moments one looks beyond. A particularly extroverted window-gazer even goes so far as 
to open one and pop their head out, seeing clearly the patterns that go on down there, a wider 
picture gifted from up here. She observes one person, for example (seemingly small because 
of the distance), apparently lost, unable to find the right path. The gazer knows where they 
should go of course, she can see the layout of the streets from this almost bird’s eye view. An 
impulse causes her to cry out, creating an immediate silence in the room.  
‘Shh!’ one of the conversants says, ‘the Zarathustra will see us!’ 
The window gazer glances back out, looking for the figure of history, half expecting a little red 
bead to appear on her chest.  
Instead, the lift across the room pings: somebody has made the journey to the top of this tower 
to bring a message, and by doing so, has shattered the mythical illusion that the architecture of 
this room attempts. The stone wall covered in ivory carvings suddenly reveals its plastic truth 
as one section of it opens like a gaping mouth. The window-gazer glances over as a man and a 
woman in grey suits enter from the incongruously unveiled elevator, hand a cream folder to the 
closest conversant, then step back into the lift and abruptly go to leave. They have many more 
floors to visit, or so they say as they efficiently step out, and must be on their way. As the lift 
door is hidden by the folly wall, the conversant left holding the folder opens it and reads aloud. 
‘It looks like it’s about updates on impact and funding criteria that we need to be clued up on’ 
he says, then putting on a tone of voice which suggests he is quoting directly rather than 
summarising, he continues: ‘We can provide business, public services and civil society 
organisations with access to world-leading academic researchers who can help you think in 
new and challenging ways’.  
There are some nods here from a few. 
‘We have awarded funding (through Impact Acceleration Accounts) to 24 universities to work 
in partnership with non-academic organisations to make better use of social science’.  
Some begin to shuffle, a little unnerved about where this narrative is going. The speaker pushes 
on regardless, growing unease lending him oratory power and speed. 
‘We support world leading research that makes a difference to lives’. 
‘We invest heavily in world class resources to provide an infrastructure which can help tackle 
some of our most pressing issues’ (Council E. a., 2017).  
‘Collaborating partners can be private sector companies, public sector bodies or voluntary 
organisations’ (Council E. &., 2016). 
‘That’s ok’ one of the fellows interjects abruptly, before everyone begins to get overly 
concerned. She explains her calm: ‘although admittedly there are often overlaps with what we 
do, these are requirements of the social sciences and most of us work in political philosophy’. 
The reader looks up, a nod of relief, but it is swiftly replaced by more consternation as he turns 
the page and narrates on. 
‘Why is impact assessed - Arts and humanities research offers a variety of direct and indirect 
social and economic benefits. Our Business Processes and Analysis Team co-ordinates the 
collection of evidence and impact to address key questions posed by the Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, demonstrating the value of arts and humanities 
research; why it should be funded by the taxpayer; and what ‘added value’ the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council as an organisation delivers’. 
Some muttering begins to soundtrack the continued narration, but the pace the reporting has 
gathered prevents any further interruptions.  
‘Collaborative Doctoral Awards provide funding for doctoral studentship projects proposed 
by a university based academic, to work in collaboration with an organisation outside of higher 
education’ (Council A. a., Collaborative Doctoral Awards, 2015).  
‘How we collect impact - We take a portfolio approach to developing the evidence base. A mix 
of quantitative and qualitative information is important to make a convincing and robust case 
for the impact and value of AHRC-funded research. An increasing emphasis on accountability 
and efficiency makes this approach more relevant than ever. Quantitative evidence, for 
example, is needed to provide ‘hard’ evidence of outputs of funding, whilst case studies are 
recognised as the most effective approach to demonstrating impact’ 
‘Development of AHRC Impact Webpages – As we continue to develop our impact portfolio 
and evidence collection methods we will further develop this webpage. This page will contain 
links to a large number of impact case studies categorised and searchable via a range of 
parameters, including place, sector and discipline. We will also aim to provide information 
that will assist Arts and Humanities researchers to develop their impact story. This will include 
describing how impact is defined by Research Councils, giving guidance on how to incorporate 
pathways to impact within research proposals, capture of evidence of impact, and how to better 
articulate the impact generated from arts and humanities research’ (Council A. a., Impact, 
2015).  
There is a collective sigh, a sign that all present have had enough information and now seek to 
give their reaction to it. The question of what is legitimate to study, from the perspective of the 
bodies that are mostly responsible for enabling it, is ever more so summed up in a simple 
equation: utility, or impact = legitimacy. In this case then, there is a demand for a political 
philosophy capable of such impact, from the hand that feeds. This is problematic, for the 
responses in this tower room will not be unanimous. The window-gazers are likely to react 
first, already half-prepared, even eager for this kind of theorising, despite the Zarathustra lying 
in wait for the kill; the conversants perhaps more hesitantly, unable or unwilling to unlock 
themselves from their debates for fear of what it would mean, whilst the sky-gazers have barely 
noticed. Meanwhile, the hand still holds the corn.  
 
 
 
 
1.2 Connecting funding and impact legitimacy to current debates 
So, there is an increasing and emerging impact agenda within university funding, in both EHRC 
and AHRC criteria, thus straddling political theory, history of political thought and political 
philosophy (and all the grey bits in between). This paper does not dispute that some projects 
may well continue to receive funding which make no claims to impact, such as conversations 
which we have solely within the academy for conversation’s sake, but I do believe that an 
impact agenda as a justification for ‘taxpayer’s’ money is on the rise, and therefore I seek to 
consider normative theory’s reaction to funding bodies that are increasingly making it clear 
that a ‘legitimate’ subject to study, work and do research on, within a higher institution, is one 
that demonstrates ‘the value of arts and humanities research’ to that presumed ‘taxpayer’.  
It is also true though, that what might be thought of as ‘legitimate’ by a research council may 
not be for the practitioners of the subject, perhaps having no interest in developing ‘their impact 
story’, or, harbouring concerns over where this leads. This ‘impact’ demand then, is to seriously 
consider the ‘nature’ of our chosen discipline and whether it can be reconciled with this 
particular framing of ‘legitimacy’. Thus, it is not just timely to discuss this in a practical sense 
of actually getting research grants and PhD places, but as a philosophical moment, for I think 
such a situation offers something almost new in regards to our self-reflective musings. This is 
not a reflection had at luxury, but one done out of necessity, or at least with an added scrutiny 
which brings a sharp focus to an age-old academic debate regarding the purpose of political 
theorising. Within this circumstance of finance, numbers and department survival, a little dose 
of our own realism infiltrates this question of the ‘nature’ of political philosophy.  This will 
inevitably create tensions that jeopardise future PhD projects in the field, and therefore the 
subject as a whole.  
Henceforth, in my view, directly confronting the challenges of funding criteria needs to be 
talked about alongside academic debates, more than I think it currently is, because it not only 
deals with the practical matter of subject survival, legitimacy and reflection over ‘use’ within 
the discipline, but these demands and the environment they create also bring up old issues and 
impasses in the arguments we have with historicism and realism: historical critiques of 
normative foundations undermine the idea of a normative theory that produces the ‘right thing 
to do’, which is surely where our ‘impact’ would lie.    
Therefore, if normative theorists and political philosophers as a whole fall short of or ignore 
these impact demands there is an argument that we turn out to be utterly disconnected and 
irrelevant to the society we comment upon; so then, to a certain extent, it is worth at least 
considering if we also fail to deal with our own anxieties regarding impact, as well as the 
aforementioned critiques. This is why I have thrown the funding criteria into the melting pot 
already swirling around regarding normative theory and its transformative claims: essentially, 
the narrative of ‘impact’ from beyond the academy, opens up unresolved battlegrounds within 
it. Without a series of responses, normative theory will be found wanting and without an answer 
in a practical, and academic, sense, leaving it nowhere to go. What then, is the present case for 
a more normative, normative theory?  
 
1.3 If the cap fits…: normative theory as it currently is within an impact agenda 
In that debate over whether or not normative theory ought to be more impact based, is also 
intertwined the question of whether or not it even has the capacity to be, which presumably, is 
a question of immediate interest for the research councils. Before we worry ourselves with the 
‘should’ issue, let us first make sure the second demand is even possible. Is normative theory 
adaptable to such an agenda? 
Political philosophy is, to my mind, reflection on how we live collectively, which requires us 
to also conceptually analyse the terms which we rely upon to engage in this. This pursuit only 
becomes normative when such reflection is ‘pursued in light of’ what we ‘should do’ (Lane, 
2011, p. 133) (emphasis added), but it ought not discard the conceptual analysis which was part 
of our philosophical musings in the first place – this is what keeps normative theory a form of 
political philosophy1.  
This is a simple, not necessarily fixed distinction, but it helps us to hone in on what the purpose 
and effect of this intervening modal verb is exactly. There are two aspects to it, which 
simultaneously co-depend and strain on each other. First, ‘should’ tells us this is an activity in 
which we will be conversing mostly in the abstract, because we are talking about what ought 
to be done yet is not, and second, that there is an action-guiding aspect hovering around what 
we discuss. For some, this action-guiding may well be the heart and soul of the activity, whilst 
for others it is perhaps something in the shadows, nothing more than a framing device for the 
abstraction. As an initial thought, we may think this at once offers a political philosophy well-
suited to the impact agenda and by the same merit, potentially rendered useless. ‘Well-suited’, 
when we consider that funding bodies are explicitly stating to institutions and taxpayers outside 
                                                          
1 This claim is essential to this paper and will be explored later 
of academia that arts and humanities research tell an ‘impact story’, or that academics in general 
can ‘help you think in new and challenging ways’. If an impact discourse demands that of 
normative theorists, then the fit can seem a good one. Put simply, the abstractions in which 
theorists engage in to find some insight in how we should live, promise the ‘new and 
challenging’, whilst the normative component easily translates into the ‘help you’.  
‘Rendered useless’ though, because ultimately, if we are to produce ‘new ways of thinking’ 
through abstracted principles, then fundamentally there is a disconnect with the world around 
us: if our abstraction is too abstract, we run the risk of appearing completely detached. I think 
it is currently fair to say that the impact agenda asks for a more explicitly normative element 
from our philosophical work than perhaps we as theorists are used to, what with talk of pairing 
up with ‘non-academic partners’ and collaborators. Thus, that which takes an ‘is’ and frames 
it with an ‘ought to’ in this impact discourse environment, has a lot more emphasis placed on 
the ‘ought’ within it, requiring a sort of ‘impact theory’, if you like. Hence, the strain makes 
itself apparent: does this extra emphasis on the action-guiding demand come at the expense of 
less abstract reflection, pulling us irrevocably closer to a realist pursuit of ‘modus vivendi 
arrangements’? (Stears, 2011, p. 178) Are our window-gazers straying too far from the 
conversations? 
Not exactly. John Rawls re-invigorated political philosophy, of course, by energising the 
normative impulse through starting from the abstract space known as the ‘veil of ignorance’, 
in order to ‘nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds’ (Rawls, 1991, 
p. 136). Thus, the implication of all this is that certain contingencies and personal involvements 
can disrupt two human possibilities: our ability to think of a ‘just’ (Rawls, 1991, p. 136) moral 
value and our capacity to agree upon its justness (not ignoring the fact that the definition of the 
former relies somewhat upon the achievement of the latter). The reasoning is that departing 
from contingencies not only clears our path of these obstacles, but also means that any 
agreement we subsequently would reach could be trusted more, over a simpler utilitarian 
calculus.  
So, when one starts one’s normative pursuit in abstraction, they are freed up to pursue 
perfectibility of a concept or value, which in fact makes normative theory adaptable to an 
‘impact theory’, rather than irrelevant to it. This is because within this activity, it is not that 
real-life events are ignored, they are ignored in the prior construction of the principle so that 
we may reach an ‘ideal’ which should be of use to identifying concerns with a specific issue or 
event. It is this trait that actually ensures normative theory is at once morally suited to action-
guiding and capable of it: there is a space where we can imagine the right thing to do, as a 
pressure upon the reality. When the regularity of the ‘is’ has clouded our moral reasoning, 
normative theory reconnects us with the ‘should’, in both the abstract, ‘new ways of thinking’ 
sense, and action-guiding ‘help you’ sense. From this perspective, pursuing ‘the right thing to 
do’ thus appears to conform to an idealised, yet practical politics. 
 
1.4 …wear it: normative theory and the potential for action guiding and co-production 
The window-gazers in the introductory indulgence above were already keeping an eye on what 
was happening beyond their ivory tower then, pondering how the conversations over the ideal 
within it, energised a normative approach to the outside world. We might consider Jeremy 
Waldron’s ‘Political Political Theory’ a good reflection of this. In this ground-breaking 
collection of theoretical works, he urges us to consider a more outwardly looking normative 
theory: ‘political theorists lose nothing when we insist that our particular concerns and the 
values and principles that we particularly emphasize are concerns in the first instance about 
elections, parties, legislatures, courts, states, regimes, and agencies’ (Waldron, Political 
Political Theory, 2016, p. 19). Our moral discussions and their normative force, should thus be 
considered directly related to our society’s actual laws and institutions. This presumably falls 
in line with new criteria which effectively decide whether or not our projects are legitimate 
candidates for funding, in terms of them making a ‘difference to lives’ (though as we shall see, 
Waldron himself seemingly has a more nuanced position than simply advocating a normative 
theory with a fully ‘prescriptive’, ‘blueprint for society’ (Waldron, What Plato Would Allow, 
1995, pp. 161, 164)).  
So far so good, but how will claims like this be measured by our research councils? As far as I 
can gauge, the major funding bodies are doing this in two ways. Firstly, the extent to which 
non-academic organisations have ‘access’ to us, where we are cast as ‘world leading 
researchers’ whose moral musings have weight, or add weight to the institution we are part of. 
In this, we either have effect as an individual through our work being read and absorbed in a 
non-academic sphere, or what we produce contributes to the official company-line of the 
university, who are listened to as a research institution. Effectively we are the Aristotle’s to the 
Alexander’s or philosophers in a think tank, where what we say is engaged with the places 
where politics ‘goes on’. Here, there is a presumption that our voices have the potential to be 
heard by society in general, almost as much as by someone in a political position: ‘In these 
cases, it would be fair to say, its principal educative impact is in the forming or refining of 
political sensibilities and political judgement, rather than the transmission of a definite set of 
findings’ (Dunn, 1996, p. 13). Secondly, our impact is measured in actual ‘collaboration’ or 
co-production with ‘non-academic partners’. With this, our work is tied into a particular 
organisation, where it therefore must be of use to be considered worthy of ‘partnership’. It 
should, on some level, produce ‘results’, whatever they are predefined as, directly relevant to 
our ‘collaborators’. It is not only focussed on a specific problem, but a specific organisation 
already involved with the issue in some way.   
In both methods of appraisal, an explicitly normative theory seems to be necessary, and the 
foundation of a ‘Political Political Theory’ is the first step to this, where the abstract principles 
we discuss at length within academia, are relevant to specific events or institutions outside of 
the ivory tower. In this framing, ideologies and principles founded within a ‘veil of ignorance’ 
do matter, because they act to expose actions, laws or policies which contradict our moral 
compasses; thus, why we should ‘insist’ that our philosophical pursuits are ‘in the first instance’ 
‘concerns’ with actual events and institutions. Therefore, justice as a metaphysical discussion 
is applicable to debates over contract law, for instance, or to specifically cite an example which 
this paper is concerned with, freedom in the abstract sense is useful in putting a moral pressure 
on real, trending legislation regarding public space and the homeless2. So, our urge to gaze out 
of the ivory tower window in fact comes from our engagement with abstract principles, rather 
than our abstractions being in conflict with that.  
Under such a perspective, political philosophy can be ready for this impact shift, if we move 
closer towards a more transformative normative theory. As ‘world leading researchers’ one 
would expect nothing less from us than action guiding theoretical work of use to those 
institutions or organisations outside academia, and on occasion even collaborative, co-
production. However, this preparedness and its premise is disputed. What then, would be the 
objections to this understanding of the subject, where do they come from, and what state do 
they leave political philosophy in within an academy already anxious about the normative in 
normative theory, put under the gaze of an impact discourse? 
 
 
                                                          
2 This is a direct reference to Jeremy Waldron’s ‘Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom’, which I will talk of in 
detail later.  
Part 2 - Objection, Objection, Objection! 
 
2.1 An objection of philosophy 
The understanding of normative theory as an abstract pursuit with an action-guiding element 
seems easy enough, but the balance we strike between the two is a more complicated, and 
aggravated, matter: ‘The purpose of our theorizing is – ironically to be sure, but not regrettably 
– never actually intended to guide action’ (Lamb, 2016, p. 18). This is our first response to a 
more explicitly normative, normative theory, grounded in the idea that political theory is 
determined by content, not expertise, thus whether in a lecture hall or pub conversationists are 
‘in some sense engaging in the same essential activity’. 
These different visions of political philosopher as scientist on the one hand, and activist on the other, are each 
attempts to explain the role of a professional practitioner, figures that are likely to be employed by – or have been 
employed by, or are preparing to be employed by – a university or equivalent institution. Although discussions of 
the nature of the subject are often framed in this way, in being so they arguably miss something very important 
about the nature of political philosophy, not as an area of specialised academic enquiry, but rather as a human 
activity’ (Lamb, 2016, p. 4).  
This being the case, ‘It is ‘simply’ the lack of deadline for decisions, and consequent luxury of 
time, that defines the political theorist and not her expertise on the subject matter about which 
she writes’ (Lamb, 2016, p. 5). This is not to deny that the academic culture within which 
discussions take place is not different or distinct – they involve a ‘high level of philosophical 
abstraction’ and are ‘expressed in more demotic terminology’, for example. What this does 
suggest, is that when we transfer the normative element in these debates beyond the academy 
into moral instruction we should be very wary of the premise that we are ‘world leading 
researchers’, for, however light a touch we may apply, we still imply a moral authority which 
is misplaced. We are not in fact giving expert advice, but reproducing a certain way of doing 
normative discussion. Essentially, reproducing a particular culture of ‘having conversations 
about the same issues’ (Lamb, 2016, p. 4) (The irony here in regard to realist critique – which 
I will come to later - I am sure is not lost). This therefore cannot have the weight of moral 
expertise, and so cannot be asked to justify itself in the manner that an impact discourse 
seemingly, and increasingly, demands. Or, if we seek not to simply impose and reproduce our 
academic traditions of debate, and moderate this in order to have the conversation in the same 
language with our ‘non-academic partners’, then to put it crudely, what is the point in us being 
there? What do we bring to the table? What are we co-producing? 
This point seems particularly pertinent when considered alongside Ian Hampsher-Monk’s 
claim that in our current times ‘political argument takes place within an unspecialised, demotic 
linguistic field’ and so is mostly ‘conducted through rhetoric’ (Hampsher-Monk, 2011, pp. 112, 
113). Normative theory, by its own standards, cannot engage in rhetoric at the expense of truth 
claims (which are of course under a historical gaze not truths but ‘local prejudices’), and so 
becomes too isolated and removed to actually employ the normative task. Thus, effectively it 
cannot work as a form of political comment which seeks to be advisory beyond academic 
debate. The philosopher begins to realise the ivory tower is also her prison that she has been 
locked within. This leaves any defence over its merit and worth restricted solely to the same 
moral discussions within the academy. We may conclude that such a form of internal valuation 
is bankrupt, particularly when it is a subject which regularly looks on political action, yet 
struggles to take action. 
It is worth mentioning though that this does not mean our academic is devoid of any expertise 
at all, just that it is only recognisable internally, within a university institution:  
The expert on political philosophy is a scholar and her knowledge is necessarily located in and defined by a 
domain, the discipline in which she has epistemic competence. She is the person who has studied, for example, 
the writing of Thomas Hobbes or John Rawls intensively and to an advanced level, who perhaps teaches their 
theories to students, who might write essays that advance our understanding of, and appreciation for, them, and 
who has received the professional recognition that comes with university association through such statuses as 
employment, affiliation, or the conferral of a doctorate in that field (Lamb, 2016, p. 6) 
This ‘institutional’ expertise (Lamb, 2016, p. 7) with which a supervisor is recognised as having 
over a PhD student for example, can be wielded, because it is within an academic ‘domain’. 
The former is likely to have a better knowledge of Rawls, from which the latter can gain. But, 
this ‘advanced level’ of normative knowledge, does not translate into a moral expertise outside 
of the academy. A call for external ‘impact’ to justify the use of taxpayer’s money in such a 
way is therefore anathema to this view of political philosophy or theory.  
This tension between philosophy as an activity and the normative, action-guiding pursuit that 
Lamb pulls at, relies upon favouring one side of a distinction made in normative theory by 
Jeremy Waldron in ‘What would Plato allow’. Here, Waldron gives us a framing of political 
philosophy into two endeavours: ‘evaluative’ and ‘prescriptive’ (Waldron, What Plato Would 
Allow, 1995, p. 161). This article therefore in some ways offers the building blocks to the 
objections an over-enthusiastic window-gazer, looking for funding, may face when talking 
about the ‘impact’ of their theorising. This is because even though Waldron has more recently 
called for a ‘Political, Political Theory’, within this older piece (published in 1995), he tackles 
the issue with presuming a philosophical work is action-guiding. Here Waldron argues that we 
should not make the mistake of assuming political philosophy is just normative theory, or even 
that all normative theory is some kind of ‘wishlist’ designed and discussed ‘for immediate 
implementation’ (Waldron, What Plato Would Allow, 1995, pp. 162, 159). Waldron insists that 
often, ‘what looks like nothing more thoughtful than the presentation of a normative blueprint 
– a utopia, an ideal society, a new dispensation – can often be a cover for much deeper 
speculation in philosophy’ (Waldron, What Plato Would Allow, 1995, p. 164). This is because, 
despite what we might feel and acknowledging the world beyond as our ‘first concern’, 
theorists are not writing policy proposals or describing perfect societies for political leaders, 
but exploring the consequences and implications of a normative concept in an academic, 
philosophical arena; hence, a ‘speculation’.  
Waldron uses Nozick to highlight the issue with presuming that action-guiding is meant to 
guide policy-makers and political actors rather than have force in a philosophical debate, but 
even cites Hobbes and Rousseau as good examples, having hardly been political advisors 
either, other ambitions they may have had aside. A strong argument can therefore be developed, 
proposing that normative theory done within the academy is a culture of discussion had 
predominantly in an ‘evaluative’ mode: with an abstract principle as the starting point, because 
any event it is applied to effectively works as an example, to first and foremost strengthen an 
academic argument. Incidentally, this begins to sound like an invitation to read normative 
theory in the manner of Skinner, asserting that we investigate who the interlocutors were and 
what the reason for the piece was: ‘whenever it is claimed that the point of historical study of 
such [perennial] questions is that we may learn directly from the answers, it will be found that 
what counts as an answer will usually look, in a different culture or period, so different in itself 
that it can hardly be in the least useful even to go on thinking of the relevant question as being 
the ‘same’’ (Skinner, 1969, p. 52). However, Waldron’s argument very much relies on a 
political philosophy aware of itself, or to be more accurate, political philosophers aware of the 
idea that they do write within the same field or conversation as other theorists. Thus, many 
questions they ask are in fact similar, if not the ‘same’, because they are framed within a culture 
of a philosophical arena, more so than being defined by the particular time period.  
Indeed, Waldron delivers this concept whilst claiming to ‘disassociate’ from such a historicist 
approach (Waldron, What Plato Would Allow, 1995): ‘In this age of exquisite hermeneutic 
sensitivity, we may be anxious to avoid the anachronism of reading the traditional texts in the 
light of our own concerns. But the authors whose works we are handling with this sensitivity 
had no such scruples themselves, and I think it is fair to say that our sensitivity to their context 
seriously distorts our understanding of their philosophical intentions’ (Waldron, What Plato 
Would Allow, 1995, p. 146). In effect, Waldron cites Hobbes attacks on Aristotle (amongst 
others), to show that there was an awareness of and belief in a ‘dialogue across the ages’ 
(Waldron, What Plato Would Allow, 1995, p. 146) amongst philosophers of the time, even if 
that is doubted today. Just how disassociated he is from the historical critique, is a matter for 
debate: we may think, for instance, that this claim involves an engagement in exactly the 
historical method he criticises, for coming to such a position does not just involve a close 
reading of text. But passing over this point, the conclusion is assuredly not in fashion for most 
historicists: that these text’s authors felt they were part of a recognised pursuit and theorists 
were not just writing responses to their living interlocutors and current events, but were also 
aware that they were contributing to some vague sense of a canon and a subject that went 
beyond mere immediate circumstance, a subject which therefore connects us to them directly 
through similar questions and problems – in short, political philosophy. Thus, if they were 
taking past works into account when they wrote and replying to long-deceased interlocutors 
from an ancient civilisation, they could also perceive of forthcoming generations and the 
position of their own work within any future canons: ‘the idea that he [Hobbes] would have 
insisted indignantly that we confine his work to its ‘context’ strikes me as absurd’ (Waldron, 
What Plato Would Allow, 1995, p. 147). Hobbes, Rousseau and even Hegel, Waldron claims, 
‘wrote in response to books that were written centuries ago; and it is impossible to read such 
works as Leviathan, for example, without getting the impression that the authors also intended 
their works to survive the historical vicissitudes that elicited them’ (Waldron, What Plato 
Would Allow, 1995, p. 147). If this is the case, then the context of the English civil war despite 
being of interest and perhaps even a motivator for Hobbes, is also relegated to a reference point 
for the deeper philosophical discussion over sovereign authority which Hobbes understands 
will occur again beyond his own time. Under this view, it is therefore not wrong to read Hobbes 
as if he were part of the same ‘conversation’ as our own, for that is what Hobbes himself was 
doing not only in regard to Aristotle, but also in anticipating us, as fellow theorists with a need 
to consider the same problem. Hence, the implication is that some works are written primarily 
in this literary and academic world of abstraction in response to other theorists gone, present 
and to come, rather than being first and foremost for our localised political realms of policy, 
governance and events. Should we accept this as the case, we must remember this ‘academic 
world’ is a place to discuss, theorise and propose ideas in a shared academic culture, not 
necessarily to offer concrete and absolute prescription to the events it may deliberate over as 
part of this ‘conversation’. When framed in such a way, we see their works as experiments and 
forms of evaluation over and above action-guiding for a specific problem: it may be part of it, 
but the commitment to the activity of philosophising strains against this. It is from this position 
that Waldron can say that normative theorists are not necessarily or always being prescriptive 
to wider society and politics when they do normative theory, for like Hobbes, they are 
conscious of the academic ‘dialogue’ in which they pen their ideas, and their own place as 
theorists within this culture.  
This of course is not to say that such attempts to go beyond this world of ‘conversation’ could 
not and did not ever happen, or that the actual realm of governance was ignored: ‘it would be 
wrong for me to suggest that there is no place for a philosophically informed and rigorous 
contribution to the civic discussion of legal and constitutional reform’ (Waldron, What Plato 
Would Allow, 1995, p. 147). Likewise, as Waldron concedes, it is not impossible for the 
reverse to happen: that the political realm provide the philosophical world with material – here 
he obviously mentions the Federalist Papers as an example (Waldron, What Plato Would 
Allow, 1995, p. 147). These caveats seem particularly important seeing as ‘Political Political 
Theory’ calls upon theorists to attempt a ‘much closer connection between political theory and 
law’, and asserts that ‘we certainly do need a sophisticated philosophical understanding of the 
layers of value that are implicated in the assessment of political institutions’ (Waldron, Political 
Political Theory, 2016, p. 12). We should be generous with this caveat, for we must remember 
that over 20 years separate the Plato paper from this book.  
The underlying point then, is only that we should not suppose that a work of political 
philosophy or normative theory is some kind of political manifesto, even when it may on the 
surface appear so apparently engaged with an actual place of contingencies and context, like 
Anarchy, State and Utopia, or Leviathan. Therefore, for instance, when Nozick suggests we 
abandon tax as a method of wealth redistribution, it is perhaps wrong to presume that this is 
anything more than a theoretical exploration within an academic discussion, or more 
specifically, a response to Rawls with an awareness that one is also contributing to the subject 
and academic culture of political philosophy: ‘Robert Nozick is a professional scholar, tenured 
at a great American university at the end of the twentieth century, in circumstances where he 
is free to write or teach anything he pleases, without political repercussions’ (Waldron, What 
Plato Would Allow, 1995, p. 145). Such a point is well made, and rings across many confused 
interpretations trying to consolidate Nietzsche the Zarathustra with Nietzsche the awkward 
polite man, or Rousseau the principled theorist with Rousseau the absent father.  
Thus, political philosophy is not just normative, and normative theory can and indeed ought to 
involve something other than moral medicine in its philosophical exploration: ‘we should not 
be so sure that we have had (from the thirties through the early sixties) all the conceptual 
analysis that we need, and that we now perfectly well understand the concepts of politics’ 
(Waldron, What Plato Would Allow, 1995, p. 167) (emphasis added). The argument is that we 
must remember that ‘evaluative is not the same as prescriptive’, and when writing 
predominantly within an academic debate, the former cannot and should not become the latter 
at the expense of the ‘evaluative’. Ergo, if ‘discerning the reason inherent in what already exists 
is not the same as setting out, in imagination, a plan for social construction’ (Waldron, What 
Plato Would Allow, 1995, p. 161), let us not make normative theory only about one thing – 
prescribing and guiding action – for it also, in this ethical guidance, gives us opportunities to 
reflect on concepts used, and as Lamb does, the implications of being moral guidance. A 
‘normative blueprint’ then, presumably, should not brush aside its commitment to 
philosophical analysis at the gain of instruction, for it is this ‘deeper speculation’ that maintains 
the philosophy within the normative.   
The ‘evaluative’ and ‘prescriptive’ forms are distinctions worth considering then, even if we 
do not believe they are necessarily mutually exclusive endeavours, as Lamb I think suggests. 
We may decide to push at this, reversing the concern, by pointing out that Waldron’s critique 
of the historian can be turned against his own analysis: the idea that someone like Nozick can 
write something so politically grounded, and not expect it to contribute to ideologies behind 
political governance if not policy itself, is equally ‘absurd’ as the thought that Hobbes could 
write about sovereignty in Leviathan and be ‘indignant’ if it were ever to be considered beyond 
the historical moment of the English civil war. Writing in the philosophical arena, surely 
involves the idea that what is produced and argued there, has some kind of relationship with 
those who practice politics, even as a philosophical experiment, for the purpose of such 
experiments is to offer clarifications and show how a particular way of thinking may alter our 
moral commitments in various contexts: to repeat, ‘In these cases, it would be fair to say, its 
principal educative impact is in the forming or refining of political sensibilities and political 
judgement, rather than the transmission of a definite set of findings’ (Dunn, 1996, p. 13).  
Furthermore, even if the historical moment of Hobbes was a conversation first, political 
instruction second, then the historical moment of political philosophy in more recent times is 
the challenge of ‘impact’ beyond this philosophical ‘dialogue’, through the question of its 
effect on actual politics, and so we now surely write well-aware of this. Again, Waldron himself 
seems to accept this with the claim that philosophical thinking is not separate from ‘civic 
discourse’, and that the activity of philosophy is something which can be done in a bar between 
friends as much as it is within the academy, and so, one would assume, within parliament 
assembly also: ‘Both citizens and theorists argue about politics, economy, rights, and justice: 
we do it in our seminars and journals; they do it in town halls and on the streets; and many of 
us wear both hats’ (Waldron, What Plato Would Allow, 1995, p. 147) . Hence, ground-breaking 
ways of thinking pursued within the academy would surely be of interest to the professional 
politician and governance, if, through the rhetoric, they still be in some small way in the 
business of the application of these ‘new’ outlooks.   
Nevertheless, a tension persists between our evaluative and prescriptive tendencies, and the 
objection of philosophy that Lamb more directly makes to an ‘impact theory’, does raise an 
uncomfortable issue with the consequential establishment of a scholarly moral expertise, and 
whether or not such establishment is to misconstrue the nature of philosophy. This will need to 
be resolved if this paper is to make a successful argument for a normative, normative theory. 
With Lamb, we have an explicit and understandable worry over moral authority, but in many 
ways, Waldron’s analysis of normative theory has simply made us more actively aware on the 
‘space between thought and action’, when considering the question ‘what should I do?’, in 
relation to the actual act of ‘what shall I do’ (Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 
1985, p. 18): in essence, an analysis that says normative theory should not be thought of as 
action-guiding at the expense of reflection, and even, conceptual analysis, considering that ‘we 
have not had enough’ of it.  
This is an important warning, for if we are to consider what we may lose theorising within an 
‘impact’ agenda, we should also question the presumption that we are actually going to achieve 
‘impact’. For instance, even if a co-producing political philosopher was able to overcome these 
hurdles and work with a non-academic organisation, does the concept of impact remain 
severely limited in regard to reach? Whilst the paradigm of impact is heavily skewered to co-
production, theoretical work which seeks to have impact - either because of a funding agenda 
or because of a belief in a transformative normative theory – as I have mentioned, may have to 
become narrower, focussing on the issues their collaborative ‘non-academic partners’ are 
interested in. Despite the claim that our moral theorising is applicable to and a concern with 
actual problems in our societies, in regard to co-production, there are not many collaborators 
like charities, policy makers, think tanks or institutions outside of the academic culture of 
western political philosophy asking broad questions like ‘what is justice?’, let alone to the same 
‘high levels of abstraction’ that the academic arena does. Therefore, our problem resurfaces: if 
our concerns are to be with ‘in the first instance about elections, parties, legislatures, courts, 
states, regimes, and agencies’, as I agree they should be, and we want to in some way maintain 
a space for theory as a transformative act, then it is necessary to recognise that subsequently, 
conceptual questioning of the meta-topics like justice and what view of the world the ‘right 
thing to do’ rests upon, is in danger of getting buried beneath presupposition, in the clamour to 
be transformative. This in fact, is exactly the point raised by a historical gaze onto normative 
theory: having seen the issues from our objection of philosophy then, let us now turn to an 
objection from history to a funding-friendly, impact-based, normative, normative theory.  
 
2.2 The objection of history 
It is actually in another Waldron article that we can begin, to help us examine the historical 
objection. In his thought provoking paper ‘Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom’, he 
engages negative liberty within an appeal to ‘abstract liberal principles’ (Waldron, 
Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 1991, p. 295), to frame homelessness for a 
philosophical discussion, yet at the same time it is normative in the sense that it is a moral gaze 
on a problem, which cannot hide a desire to shame ‘people into action and concern’ (Waldron, 
Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 1991, p. 323) (emphasis added)3. By pointing out that 
the freedom of the homeless in many places is impinged upon to the extent that one cannot 
even pursue ‘primal human tasks’ like urinating, eating or sleeping (Waldron, Homelessness 
and the Issue of Freedom, 1991, p. 301), without the threat of (and in many cases actual) 
interference and prohibition, it would be a particularly hard or polemic reader who was not 
moved in some way: when one examples this lack of negative liberty in such actions, 
affirmation of the concept is almost inevitable. This seems then, a perfect instance of how the 
academy’s discussion of normative theory – in this case liberal principles of negative freedom 
- can apply to and be relevant for an actual event – the problem of homelessness. This is an 
especially powerful message when Waldron highlights how many of these activities simply 
                                                          
3 I would say that I do not think this is a contradiction with the earlier article on evaluate and prescriptive 
theory, or a significant change in attitude on Waldron’s part. His analysis was concerned primarily with 
presumptions over normative theory, it does not prevent subsequent pieces of work engaging in the 
prescriptive aspect.  
have to be fulfilled before any subsequent action to get out of a homeless state, or even before 
we can make basic plans for the most rudimentary survival strategies – try looking for a shelter 
when one has not slept for two days. Essentially, they are ‘urgent’ functions that he says are 
not ‘actions that a person can wait to perform’ (Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of 
Freedom, 1991, p. 321) if one is to significantly increase one’s chance of staying alive whilst 
on the streets: thus, they are not only survival strategies in themselves, but pursuits which 
enable more attempts at staying alive. One must be able to perform them regardless of whether 
we praise or blame the homeless for their situation: even if we believe they are responsible for 
their circumstances, then we still have to allow them the chance to work themselves out of it, 
without making it actively more difficult. Objections borne from experiential or empirical 
observations, such as highlighting the active presence of a local aid program or how obstructive 
a specific homeless hangout is, still struggle to deal with the basic principle we have been asked 
to view homelessness from4: ‘even if their being homeless cannot be laid at anyone’s door or 
attributed to anything over and above their own choices or the impersonal workings of the 
market, my point remains. Their homelessness consists in unfreedom’ (Waldron, 
Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 1991, p. 306). The origin point then is the 
perfectibility of negative freedom, and it is a persuasive case when it is so strongly reinforced 
in the context of an actual event where negative freedom seems so completely absent, the reality 
distant from the origin; a reality which of course, appears so dire and desperate to us. Negative 
liberty, used to gaze on such a context, quite literally becomes a case of life or death. This type 
of normative theorising therefore appears to hold a strong element of the ‘prescriptive’ 
(Waldron, What Plato Would Allow, 1995, p. 161): telling us what is wrong, not just in the 
context of a philosophical debate, but as a society, through reaffirming a theoretical concept. 
This is an article which would, I assume, please the impact agenda. 
The historical objection here then, would be a Nietzschean paraphrasing of ‘under what 
conditions did man invent the value judgements good and evil? And what value do they 
themselves have?’ (Nietzsche F. , 1994, p. 5). Armed with this historical framing, the historicist 
is able to take what would seem the most rudimentary, agreed-upon and universal concepts, 
switch out the ‘good and evil’ for whichever moral standard he or she wishes to evaluate – in 
this case negative liberty - and trace a particular historical lineage, exposing the contingency 
of such beliefs. This raises doubt over the perfectibility of any normative value the viewer 
                                                          
4 In a second article, homelessness and community, this seems to be Waldron’s main aim: to deal with, on 
liberal terms, the ‘cosmetic communitarian’ (Waldron, Homelessness and Community, 2000, p. 406) responses 
to homelessness which effectively interweave a homeless blame within their communitarian ethics. 
applies to the event, such as Waldron’s ‘abstract liberal principles’ and its gaze onto 
homelessness.  
Now, naturally, one may balk at the audacity of such a questioning, when we consider the 
obvious awfulness that homelessness generally involves in reality, but this only serves to 
emphasise the point a Nietzschean framing makes, in many ways, strengthening the need for 
it: the masking of the normative ‘presupposition’ into one of many ‘canons of reasons’ (King, 
2009, p. 306). Simply put, any moral argument which provokes accusations of audacity and 
disbelief when questioned, is exactly the kind of thing we do need to keep a historical eye upon.  
It is of course not only this genealogical approach to moral principles which dogs the steps of 
normative theory: ‘History of political philosophy serves effectively to temper the parochialism 
of analytical theory, where complacency can so easily blind us to the controversial nature of 
our presuppositions’ (Haddock, 2011, p. 69) (emphasis added). Furthermore, grounded on a 
historicist view of the abstract search for perfectible principles, realist critiques are perhaps the 
most hostile to action-guiding on the premise of a moral right or wrong: ‘such commitments 
seem to warrant a realism like that of Guess: on what grounds are we to seek ‘justice’ or 
‘progress’, if our moral beliefs are solely the products of our local environment and historical 
setting?’ (Stears, 2011, p. 187). A normative theory which reacts to funding discourse by 
applying moral principles found through lengthy and abstracted discussions within the 
academy, to beyond this ‘philosophical arena’, is one that inevitably collapses in on itself when 
it is recognised as a specific culture, because of the impossibility this historical framing places 
over apparently moral intentions. Normative theorists are well-aware of this assault: ‘It is 
precisely this point that is taken up by philosophers like Guess who wish to make the further 
claim that the attempt to construct an abstract political philosophy must fail, because it can 
only be the local prejudices of a particularly society’ (Kelly, 2011, p. 20).  
Ironically, this historicist accusation at reproduction echoes concerns raised by Lamb, which 
spurred a departure to an ‘evaluative’ normative theory in the face of impact demands. This 
presumably, helps insulate political philosophy from accusations of invoking a dangerous 
moral authority, which invariably result from a view of normative theory as that which simply 
veils its own ‘local prejudices’ within a claim to ‘nullify’ contingencies. In short, it is a 
sidestepping to avoid normative theory as the granter of moral expertise, or an extroverted 
elitism, if you like. This however, in my view, is not a wholly convincing response or desirable 
reaction to take, where equally, an introverted elitism of sorts can be so readily thrown at the 
ivory tower that results from this retreat to academia: ‘the ressentiment of those beings who, 
being denied the proper response of action, compensate for it only with imaginary revenge’ 
(Nietzsche F. , On The Genealogy of Morality, 2006, p. 400) (emphasis added). In the context 
of our funding demands, this is perhaps even more problematic, creating issues around the 
continued survival of a subject if we as practitioners of it, are explicit in our rejection of impact 
(I will return to this).  
Admittedly though, we are also exposed under a historical scrutiny when we take the opposite 
approach of prescribing quite happily, when our moral principles are explained as being 
historically formed and contingent. If we are even a little bit engaged with the window-gazing, 
‘prescriptive’ aspect of normative theory then, what ‘particular society’ are we reproducing 
‘local prejudices’ from, other than the academic society of western political philosophy? 
Surely, if nothing else Nietzsche was arguing that the Kantian, metaphysical dialogue between 
philosophers was a partisan culture all of its own, unable to see past its constructed morality; a 
morality dependant on and borne from Socratic debate. Thus, the historicist’s claim that 
theoretical abstraction is in fact not a neutral practice or process but a partisan place or 
framework, with its own cultural bias, means that the ‘particular society’ we are regurgitating 
is normative theory: it has a specific historical construction, which in its abstraction, can 
sometimes struggle to properly consider contingencies which create certain types of moral 
claims. Here for example, we can see how corrective justice potentially gets abstracted away 
in a ‘veil of ignorance’, and when inequalities may be racially caused, this is extremely 
problematic. Failure to recognise such injustices for what they were can lead to accusations of 
‘white theory’5. Therefore, this claim not only seemingly condemns normative theory’s 
attempts to achieve its own criteria of nullifying contingencies, but also makes it potentially 
bias against or dismissive of moral claims that do not come from the abstract.  
In this gaze onto such political philosophising, history subsequently cannot help but supplant 
it as the political commentator, for the ‘claim to discern what lies at the basis of reality’ is both 
a philosophical and historical exercise (Hampsher-Monk, 2011, p. 106), and should historians 
undermine the philosopher’s gaze on reality, all that is left is the historian’s (until science 
ascends and puts all our actions down to chemical reactions, maybe). This puts realism in a 
strong position in terms of future academic research. Essentially, realism’s attack on normative 
theory relies upon what the historical gaze exposes: that the historical is how we should be 
looking at events around us. If political philosophy tries to gaze onto an event with its 
                                                          
5 This is a point raised in an excellent lecture by Charles Mills (Mills, 2012) 
https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/liberalising-illiberal-liberalism  
normative darling, then history, having subverted normative theory by ‘unmasking’ (Hoy, 
2008, p. 276) the historicity of its ‘presuppositions’, attempts to replace political philosophy as 
that which tried to get at ‘the basis of reality’ by gazing within the event: seeing its own 
localised position perhaps most distinctly so with its genealogical sweetheart. Realism is thus 
given the route to undercut normative theory. The ‘nitty gritty’ actualities of institutions 
become the only thing worth looking at, for there is nothing else outside of this other than 
similarly localised ‘nitty gritties’. Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality hence does not engage in 
the metaphysical or abstract to undermine a grouping of moralised beliefs, but instead finds an 
opposing set within history. The task of searching for what is ‘just’ in a place removed of 
contingency is replaced by ‘virtues’ (Nietzsche F. , Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 1969, p. 56) found 
deep within such contingency, the actual problems our society encounters, or in our history. 
The applicability of an idealised principle to a practical politics is rejected either as elitist, 
useless, unachievable, or even racially prejudiced, and all that matters is the force of the 
argument.  
Let us not make a straw-man of theorists though. The Straussian days of truth, or 
‘independently acquired knowledge’ (Strauss, 1988, pp. 76-77), are long passed. In its place 
we have ‘vindicatory genealogy’ (Hoy, 2008, p. 276): the recognition that something 
historically contingent can still have value attributed to it through philosophical analysis. 
Historicists must accept this notion of a vindicatory genealogy (and therefore the philosopher’s 
use of it as a riposte), for otherwise they could not believe their own ‘empirical content’ (Bevir, 
What is Genealogy?, 2008, p. 274) and value their own historical method. If what defines a 
genealogy at its base is the original premise of the historical contingency of all things, then 
genealogy itself is open to this denaturalizing process. Happily, by acknowledging the idea of 
a vindicatory genealogy, the historian has ‘no reason’ to ‘not believe both that radical 
historicism arose contingently, perhaps even accidentally, and that it is true’ (Bevir, What is 
Genealogy?, 2008, p. 275). The same however, can be said of the normative principle in play: 
the historical and genealogical critique is thus pushed back a little further, for historians seem 
forced to accept a reinterpreted universal or ‘truth’ made ‘by means of a comparison with the 
alternatives on offer’ (Bevir, The Logic of History of Ideas, 1999, p. 126). Once contingency 
has been asserted, there still needs to be a decision over whether something is worth keeping 
or not, which necessitates a working criterion. Surely, we would desire a criterion which 
accepted historical contingency but did not completely discard making a case for moral 
grounding because of that contingency, over one which simply reduced everything to 
‘accidents’ (Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 1984, p. 81) of history?  
From one perspective, this issue of evaluation that history produces is not a problem at all: ‘The 
fear that a normative theory based on history will be contingent or lack definitive justification 
is essentially a fear of pursuing a project that may be extinguished when it outlives its 
usefulness’ (Sabl, 2011, p. 176). So, there is no need to worry if we cannot judge something 
ahistorically: if a concept is no longer of use, that is its own judgement. As a result, we need 
not be concerned that we do not transcend the historical or localised when we evaluate: when 
something becomes history, that is all the evaluation we need.   
For the normative window-gazer, this no doubt raises more problems than it solves: we become 
ensnared by the ‘use’ of something, its utility, which leads us to an extreme consequentialism: 
if left unchecked by some other standard this can have fairly dangerous results. Sometimes, 
loss of a belief or principle is to be mourned, and induce a feeling of things getting worse, 
otherwise we constantly live in the naïve bliss of things always getting better. Forces of change 
and agency are thus disarmed. Similarly, we may then wonder exactly how something outlives 
its usefulness: ‘when’ seems to be doing a lot of work here. If a belief present today is being 
assessed for its value, and in that process is exposed as being historically contingent, the fact 
that it is still in use now automatically qualifies it for ‘usefulness’, for the institution, individual 
or group who make a case for it by utilising it. In other words, the existence of something can 
always have a strong case made for its ‘usefulness’, because it exists. How does it come to not 
exist then, for surely sometimes a concept has to be questioned by somebody, challenged in 
thought, before it falls to disuse? It cannot always be simple loss of habit which ends it. With 
such a manner of measuring worth, nothing ever really stops, or literally every moment in 
history is reduced to fate, fortune, or the retrospective. Nietzsche and Foucault did much in 
taking on the formidable dialectic aimed at ‘dissolving the singular event into an ideal 
continuity’ (Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 1984, p. 88), but we would also do well 
to remember they were not replacing one totalising ‘truth’ of history with another: ‘That the 
historian’s claim is effectively a philosophical one (i.e. a claim about the universally parochial 
conditions of philosophical speech) is, of course, ironic, and is surely damagingly so when 
formulated in a language particular enough to be identified as itself a claim within a parochial 
philosophical position’ (Hampsher-Monk, 2011, p. 109) 
Likewise, how do we know whether a concept, practice or belief is still useful or if simple habit 
is actually working in the reverse and maintaining it? Is there a distinguishable difference? If 
we want to challenge a habit we would indeed think there was a difference, but then how would 
we effectively judge between one set of historical norms and another knowing both are 
ultimately built on nothing but contingency, if that be all that is open to us? How can we critique 
something if it is still in use? There must therefore, however small, be room for valuation and 
judgement where we can recognise that we create evaluating principles from ‘a particular 
society’ but are not imprisoned there. If anything is to change at all, there has to be some 
external position of a modest degree that one can conceive of if not always utilise, emergent 
from one’s own historicity, in order damn a belief, concept or practice, and consign it to the 
past. A tower to reach for, but not start from; a thought space to explore. Yet if this type of 
almost ‘liberated’ thought to ‘reach for’ is only found in historical comparison, in the captivity 
‘freeing’ genealogy, then can the philosopher not argue that we are not being freed at all, merely 
substituting a set of historical values for others, which have their own restraints? Indeed, in 
such a process, we should therefore ask ‘whether contingency simply and necessarily equates 
to freedom’ (Lane, 2011, p. 141). Thus again, the question of how practices and beliefs become 
genuinely distasteful and get discarded arises.  
Essentially, if it is the case that we are simply regurgitating localised truths and repackaging 
them as tools for comparison, then normative theorists can contend that there is nothing wrong 
about their reproductions (reproducing localised claims is after all inevitable for everyone 
under a historical gaze), if they simply addendum these comparisons with recognised 
contingency. Likewise, a claim can be made that this acknowledgement would do nothing to 
worsen the quality of arguments the practice produces: when one writes about negative freedom 
and homelessness for instance, one need not necessarily believe to have settled the debate over 
negative freedom once and for all, to create something worthwhile. What we end up with then, 
is a presupposed, abstracted principle, but one that has been footnoted with acknowledged-
contingency, to apply to a ‘real-life’ problem as an adaption to a discourse of impact.  
‘Division of labour’ here is key: political philosophers are all too ready to engage in further 
‘evaluative’ discussions that have resulted from a historical framing of presupposed principles, 
which were applied in a ‘prescriptive’ manner. Yet, this separation of duties or pursuits, in my 
opinion, has a problematic implication: that it is an inevitable outcome of a ‘contingent’ 
normative theory, that such conceptual analysis of principles be separate from the moment of 
prescription or ‘blueprint’. This would therefore likely mean that in an ‘impact’ environment, 
funding councils would be increasingly insistent on and interested in the latter ‘blueprint’, and 
less concerned over the presumption from which it is built. Of course, often in academia, our 
work is selective: sometimes between ourselves, as we accept others will do the conceptual 
analysis bit whilst we do the application (and vice versa), and sometimes between our own self 
as we write a methods piece one time and a substantive one the other, otherwise, when exactly 
would the normative get done? Certainly, not in the confines of a paper or article. This 
seemingly squares off the problem we have, between a Waldron who talks of what normative 
theorists may be doing versus what we presume they are doing, with a Waldron who talks of 
engaging theory with institutions and actual law, or who writes a piece on homelessness with 
a presupposed principle of negative freedom. However, this ‘division of labour’ seems a little 
clumsy to me, even dangerous, but also perhaps even un-necessary, when we realise there is a 
way to combine these labours of history, philosophy and action guiding, or narrative, reflection 
and prescription. This relies on scrutinising one last contingency of normative theory that has 
not been widely recognised and considering what we can build from that, which comes when 
we take another look through the historical perspective: yet not by gazing at the normative 
principle, but the normative method. 
 
2.3 Prologue to a resolution: an objection of method 
It seems a little banal to re-emphasise, by way of introducing this section, that when a moral 
value or normative principle is so effectively historicised, like Nietzsche’s vision of morality, 
the obvious response of a normative theorist is to then subsequently build up a riposte as to 
why the principle still has value. I feel that repeating this point is important though, for what 
we realise is this brings the argument away from a historical framing and back onto the political 
philosopher’s home turf.  
What we find in this impasse between historicism and philosophy, and realism and normative 
theory, is that we are not even speaking to each other. This is a real danger, for if an impact 
agenda adds urgency to the formation of a ‘legitimate’ and relevant, transformative normative 
theory, then we must realise that historical and realist criticisms are of paramount importance 
in doing this effectively - with scrutiny. As a consequence of not doing this, we are currently 
engaged in a toing and froing regarding the historicisation and subsequent vindication of 
normative morals, and in this battleground we have, in the main, overlooked something: 
‘adopting a historical perspective on the method our subject employs may well prove 
invaluable’, and so we should give it equal attention (Floyd, 2011, p. 38). Matthew King for 
example, has argued that the Foucualdian ‘project’ was to ‘rationally criticize particular 
rationalities’, where the targeted ‘rationalities’ are ‘not anything like forms of reasoning’ but 
concepts and ideals which are presented as ‘canons of reasons’, such as madness (King, 2009, 
p. 306). This view for genealogy and of Foucault’s work, I think, tends to take us more down 
the path of unravelling the perfectibility of concepts and principles, rather than focusing on the 
‘forms of reasoning’ which lead us to our ‘canonical’ principles, or as we have called them, 
‘presuppositions’. At the very least, this implies a separation between examination of principle 
and method. He cites Foucault where the French philosopher appears to be emphasising the 
former aspect to his work: ‘as if it were not possible to write a rational criticism of rationality’ 
(Foucault, How Much Does it Cost for Reason to Tell the Truth?, 1996, p. 353). In this framing 
King gives us, the main target is not rational processes then, but a solidified, almost 
unquestioned perception of values claiming rationality: as I have said, the concepts we arrive 
at from our use of it. ‘Be rational’ one might say to someone refusing to acknowledge X, and 
the inference here is that by following procedures which count as ‘being rational’, X becomes 
as canonical as the mind-set or process of reasoning which precedes it. Genealogy can have a 
narrow focus on a specific ideology or moral value with the aim of disconnecting this 
presumption, in which it remains limited to exposing the history of good and evil, insanity, or 
liberty, by showing that it is not rational processes that brought us to our concept, but historical 
accidents or manoeuvres for power. However, in all of these projects is also an eye (which has 
become lazy) on the forms of reasoning, which in my view could be more active: genealogy 
can be utilised to reflect on both the concept or ideal within its crosshairs, and the manner of 
thinking that promises such ideals, particularly when that means that one must subsequently 
also reflect on the rationality behind one’s own genealogical process, given that in order to be 
convincing, genealogy itself must be rational in regards to relying on its own evidence.  
When we do normative theory with the principle as the starting point, within the work we are 
doing, the principle is in danger of becoming a ‘canon of reason’ for that work; this is a 
drawback of using it in this way. The obvious thing to do when faced with such presuppositions, 
as a genealogist, is to tackle these ‘canons’, unearthing the layers to undermine the purchase 
they have on our world today: to be an archaeologist and strip the universal force from the 
viewer’s principles. Yet as we have seen, many theorists accept contingency and acknowledge 
that they are indeed working with presuppositions when they try to apply normative theory to 
an actual event or real-life problem.  
However, this accepting of contingency that has been performed, a kind of ‘footnoting’ of it 
that anti-foundationalists do6, has still ignored one fact – you cannot simply recognise 
contingency and then carry on with a method that emerged from a context which did not widely 
or seriously acknowledge it, for you are then using a method that does not fit with this more 
flexible interpretation of the universal ideal. Or, at least, it is not erudite to think that one can 
merely reinterpret the principle without reinterpreting the method which delivers it. Thus, if 
you are going to ‘footnote’ an abstract principle with contingency, you need to adapt the 
method so that it better reflects this footnoted principle. My point here is that a way of doing 
normative theory – the principle as the starting point – has become default, and it is a method 
which places the principle at the point of origin because it relies on, was even formed from, the 
idea that a universal value found from a non-localised, contingent-free abstract space was 
achievable, and therefore applicable to any problem exactly as a universal from a privileged 
point of origin. When we consider that Nietzsche’s question asked us to contemplate the 
conditions under which a certain morality was created, contained in that was a questioning of 
the process which produced it. Thus, the implication of Nietzsche’s question means we have 
to reform normative theory’s default way of pursuing the right thing to do, so that it is not a 
method which has stayed unchanged from a historical context where the universality of the 
normative principle and its position at the start of things, was not under contention (or the 
contention was generally overlooked or ignored). If sp, then that method is no longer suitable, 
for in our ‘localised’ culture of western political philosophy we do exist in a context in which 
the universal principle is not only contended, but the challenge to it is even accepted by 
normative theorists themselves. We therefore need to reshape our normative method so that it 
correlates with the new contingent position the principle is in. This may not actually involve 
much, perhaps just subtle shifts, but we cannot continue unreflectively in a manner that 
presupposes the ideal as the starting point and all-applicable universal, when we accept the 
universal’s more modest position as the ‘best account of the world currently on offer’ (Bevir, 
What is Genealogy?, 2008, p. 269) – especially so, in the context of an ‘impact theory’ and 
Lamb’s concern over the moral expert, for an expert who cannot definitively give us the 
‘correct answer’, is not an expert, but a guide or provocateur. React to this we must, but 
essentially, when we accept our clarifying principle as being somewhat affected by localised 
                                                          
6 ‘Anti-foundationalism requires one to avoid appeals to given truths, but there are other ways of justifying 
knowledge. Truth can act as a regulative ideal in that our interactions with our environment give us a good 
reason to take the theories we select with our criteria of comparison as successive approximations to the 
truth’ (Bevir, The Logic of History of Ideas, 1999, p. 126) 
prejudice, do we in effect make a methodological error if we carry on using the same method 
which relied upon the universal, which would make us kind of half-experts? Being the case, 
we must ask ourselves whether or not we should continue to presuppose our normative value 
‘at the beginning as the beginning’ when the purpose for it being there has now been 
undermined, but the demand for ‘new and challenging thinking’ has intensified. 
At the heart of it, I think our methodological default of normative principle as starting point is 
therefore perhaps now the biggest presupposition there is: a presupposition of method, which 
is equally problematic, for the power of the principle is not just defined by what the principle 
is – a truth or a prejudice - but its positioning or role in relation to our narrative. In other words, 
using it as a universal and framing an event with it in such a way, as an impact theory will 
inevitably demand, conflicts with a recognition of universal principles as contingent and locally 
reproduced. Next then, in this third half, will be my attempt to match a way of doing normative 
theory to this realisation which is suitable: to essentially propose the ‘best method for the best 
account’, thus making normative theory something which can prescribe for impact without 
giving up on the ‘deeper speculation’ of conceptual analysis, for surely to do such a thing 
would confirm Lamb’s concerns and result in a normative theory founded on a moral authority. 
This means that as well as proposing a solution to the methodological issue I feel is present, I 
will also need to solve the internal concerns over the distortion of the ‘nature’ of political 
philosophy when adapted to an environment demanding its direct use, and the historicist/realist 
concerns over the ‘reproduction’ of presuppositions – or, the ‘objection of philosophy and the 
‘objection of history’. 
  
  
Part 3 - A Method for Legitimacy?  
 
3.1 A proposed approach for a method: narrative starting point 
At this juncture, those who are familiar with Waldron’s work on homelessness may make the 
point that he does recognise the contingency of the principle and its relationship to the 
normative method of principle as starting point, when he presents a brief case for the relevance 
of negative freedom in the context of what it means for homelessness, before he frames their 
‘predicament’ (Waldron, Homelessness and Community, 2000, p. 406) with it, and so indeed 
he is not too ‘hasty’ with this methodological ‘presuppostion’. He outlines homelessness the 
issue, then introduces negative freedom the value. This is a worthy objection to my point, and 
it is important to remember that Waldron’s work serves more as inspiration for this paper for 
what it achieved as a step forward, and less as target for an imagined failure. Yet, this message 
of normative pursuit, whether we see it as ‘evaluative’ or ‘prescriptive’, gives us the following 
inception: here is something I feel unsettled by or am opposed to, why is that, and what 
normative principle does it infringe upon? In this, the principle is still brought in and applied 
onto the apparent ‘problem’, even if the problem is outlined first of all. This is what I mean by 
an origin or starting point: not necessarily that we actually stylistically begin with a normative 
ideal, but that at some point we are asked to frame our issue with it, with a tendency that does 
not extensively allow the event to impose back on or change the ideal, to even become part of 
the discussions which form it. We keep the abstract insulated and our principles unaffected, 
other than to simply remould them to make them more ‘practical’ (see below). Thus, although 
stylistically what we have is - problem – principle – evaluation, methodologically we are still 
getting something like this: ‘here is an intellectual ideal, and here is an example of why it is 
necessary for our political landscape’. Although we may retreat from our window-gazing to 
disagree over the principles we hold, when we come to utilise them, we apply the principle 
assuming perfectibility: in essence, regardless of what the principle is, we still gaze onto an 
event, based on a justification that where we gaze from is removed of the ‘contingencies which 
put men at odds’. Waldron’s ‘abstract liberal principles’ are applied in a manner where the 
context of our behaviour cannot shape the ideal, but the ideal is presupposed to shape our 
behaviour within a context.  
This idea of a ‘challenge to the ideal’ from the event we apply the ideal to, is important in the 
perspective of the historical view which tells us that there are no such purified principles, but 
a swapping of one set of contingent beliefs for another, for in that mind-set we are merely 
reproducing arguments from the academy which are just as conditional. The danger is that the 
normative method seems reluctant or incapable to fully explore how an ideal can be challenged 
through contingency: not just made more practical to fit with a ‘reality’, but actually made 
more ideal. At least, it is not a method that was formed for such a thing, and so in some sense, 
it is a bit of a botch job to try and make it so. By having abstraction as our starting point, as a 
default, because of a methodological process, are we always in danger of overlooking times 
when the actuality of an event could in fact teach the ideal something, and not just in a ‘realistic’ 
manner? In essence, is there a chance the reality has conjured something that would aid our 
idealistic abstractions, instead of hinder them? Even, when we remember the issue regarding 
racial discrimination and corrective justice, that the contingencies can form the moral principle: 
‘certain political actions do sometimes speak more clearly than certain moral thoughts’ (Floyd, 
2011, p. 60) (emphasis added). To consider this, that we may create ideal principles just as well 
from a context as we do prior to one (and not only workable, realistic ones), we need to examine 
the unchallenged supremacy of abstraction as the ideal-maker (and therefore the starting point 
for action guiding work). To do that, we can challenge the worth of ‘relocating’ our mindset to 
achieve greater clarity, but also examine the extent to which it does actually do this, and 
whether or not it is thus qualitatively distinct from other forms of theorising.    
If the case for abstract theorising is that it distances us from contingencies which ‘puts men at 
odds’, then there is a fundamental claim within that that it stands apart from simply building a 
moral framework from experiences. But is this actually the case? Can one really rid oneself of 
subconscious influences which surely pervade our attempts to abstract? For example, if we 
devise a thought experiment with a runaway trolley cart to find what the right thing to do is, 
we know the images and pictures we create in this abstract place rely heavily upon our 
contingent experiences, even down to how frightened or panicked we may feel about the idea 
of a runaway trolley cart. What we have done here though, is reduce the contingencies down 
to a bare minimum: we are not discussing the 6.32am from London St Pancras hurtling towards 
either a group of nurses or lawyers, but the core of our abstraction still holds a foot in the reality 
of our experiences. Therefore, if we understand realism as taking a real event or set of 
experiences and building an idea of normative from that, then an abstract political philosophy, 
viewed in this way, is not different by definition, only by degree. We may choose to put more 
of the ‘nitty gritty’ into the abstraction in the hope that it actually becomes a useful and relevant 
practice in action-guiding, or we may reduce those contingencies because we think such 
thoughts cloud our idea of ‘right’. In the former, we are consciously inviting experiences to 
adjust our moral view, whilst in the latter we are limiting such influences to subconscious 
experiences. It is however, a balancing act between the two, not a separate activity, begging 
the question: could we not ask of realism something a bit more ambitious than ‘modus vivendi 
arrangements’ (Stears, 2011, p. 178), whilst tempting ideal theory down from its ivory tower?  
In essence, the distance we put between thought and event is greater, but all roads eventually 
lead back to Rome, and if we think otherwise, we are fooling ourselves. For now, let us say 
that by not considering this as a possibility, we put the abstracted normative value on a 
cleansed, moralised pedestal, which of course is the point. But still, this question niggles at me. 
Currently in normative theorising, I feel, such prejudices perhaps put too much faith in the 
abstract so that the insistence on the deliberative process forgets to deliberate itself, or neatly 
places that in another pocket or philosophical moment. When thought of as a truly prior and 
separate activity which forms the ideal, abstract theorising holds us ‘captive’ (Owen, 2002, p. 
226), so we are unable to identify when a removing of a contingency is not simply deliberating 
without that which ‘puts men at odds’, but the application of power itself7: essentially, to apply 
a normative principle as a starting point is to forget that normative theory is not only, to 
paraphrase into singular, not a ‘canon of reasons’, but also, is not a canon of reasoning either.  
When this occurs, does this insistence on the deliberative process become one which shapes 
and excludes also? This would be the point Foucault would say considering ‘illegitimate’ forms 
of resistance8. It is a point we should always consider. From this narrative what I think we can 
learn is that the process by which we prescribe normative theory, makes too much of a habit 
of beginning after the deliberation of the principle, which of course would seem the obvious 
thing to do when the principle is there to frame a problem, but in fact I believe we can have our 
cake and eat it concerning this: we can scrutinise and conceptually analyse our chosen ideal 
within our prescription. However, when we footnote our principle with the claim that it is 
                                                          
7 Michel Foucault, of course, provides an excellent critique of this: “What is this Reason that we use? What are 
its historical effects? What are its limits, and what are its dangers? How can we exist as rational beings, 
fortunately committed to practicing a rationality that is unfortunately crisscrossed by intrinsic dangers?’ 
(Foucault, Space, Knowledge, and Power, 1991, p. 249).  
8 In such a political framing, any notion of a new system with its own set of moral limitations that may 
accompany a resistance movement must be envisioned post-struggle, for a creation of values beyond that of 
identity forming is to ‘extend our participation in the present system’ (Foucault, Revolutionary Action: "Until 
Now", 1977, p. 230). Hence, violence, cannot be disregarded under the values of the system which the 
resistance opposes, for that is simply to ‘extend’ ‘participation’ within it.  
 
discussed in abstract detail elsewhere, we divorce the arguments for applying normative 
principles from the process of challenging them, as if it is right they be two separate activities. 
There is a divide between having our conceptual security undermined and having it reinforced, 
insulating it, which I think leads too easily to casual acceptance of presupposition. Similarly, 
as I have argued, we completely deny the possibility that the ideal can be made more ideal, 
from a particular event. This is how our perfectible principle is not ‘challenged’ by the context 
it frames: in a normative theory where the principle is the starting point, to repeat, we do not 
expect to learn something about the ideal itself from the event we apply it to, other than how it 
may need to be watered down to fit with reality. But, as I have argued, cannot events in fact 
mould and improve on our principle in the ideal sense, in ways which we claim abstraction 
can, for as offered, perhaps there is no distinctive difference in the definition of what we do, 
only the distance we place between experience and moral reflection? 
For sure, this distance may well provide insight more often, because in most cases it is useful 
to be far from contingencies to theorise ideals. However, I think, this distance can be achieved 
by building concepts from a narrative, not framing it with them: from walking through an event 
and coming out the other side, or trying to get into our ivory tower, as opposed to looking out 
of it. This is what we can be aiming for anyway. It of course, requires a certain level of 
commitment to recognising the historical limits of prior-event abstraction. For that, 
manipulations of Nietzsche’s question are therefore always present to remind us and dog our 
normative steps, but equally, we need not chain ourselves to its leash as Guess has done, and 
stay there. In a sense, even if we believe we cannot empty our heads of contingencies 
completely in order to find the absolute ‘right’ thing to do, there must be some acceptance that 
it is possible to ‘relocate’ ourselves to a certain extent, to be ‘better’ at considering a concept 
than we were before we tried this ‘relocation’, and therefore to be ‘better’ at it than someone 
else: otherwise we would believe that our perspectives were ‘equally local or perspectival, and 
that no contrast in this respect could conceivably be drawn from inside our thought’ (Williams, 
Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, 2000, p. 484) (emphasis added), which as Bernard 
Williams argued, would be a mistake. Therefore, this is the essential middle-ground I am 
placing my stance within: we may not be able to completely remove ourselves to the outer 
space of abstraction, totally disconnected from the contingencies down on the ground, but some 
will make it to the upper atmosphere whilst others only jump – hence, I repeat, the difference 
is not by definition, but distance. Thus, our ivory tower of abstraction exists as a place to seek, 
and some might get closer than others. Being closer, denotes a comparative, and a comparative 
assessment implies there are measurements which further tell us we are not all rooted into being 
‘equally local’, even if we cannot ascend to godhood. Importantly then, being ‘better’ does not 
imply an authority that goes unquestioned, or automatically accepted. An ‘expert’ that can be 
refuted, but perhaps should not be ignored.   
Under this way of thinking, there is no reason to not try and attempt such idealistic searching, 
after we have begun our moral enquiry from a realist or historical position that is essentially 
informing us first through a narrative: we begin outside, but search for the window-gazer in the 
tower, rather than starting alongside her or him and breaking out. This subtle reversal though, 
is not simply stylistic, but has significant consequences on the process of the normative 
method. Hence, philosophical work where the ‘freedom’ of the homeless is not preceded by 
presupposed principles which arrive to a place of realities, ready-made for application, 
assuming we would be satisfied that they have been discussed in theoretical terms at length 
elsewhere. However, that does not stop one from following that story with post-narrative 
attempts at proposals built upon post-narrative ideal principles. Indeed, it is to be encouraged, 
otherwise we would simply be recounting something that is happening.   
To begin in a realist or historical framing but seek to move beyond it because one has not 
discarded the potential for an ideal principle that can lead us to a better outcome, is not I think 
contradictory. Let us for example, consider the following: at some points in our histories of 
ideas, whether from an individual or a small group, somebody had to have deviated, and to do 
so, those first few, almost certainly had to have been thinking and judging somewhat loosened 
of their own historical conditions; and if an idea was ‘new’, then not harking back to the past 
either. Even if an idea is not new but reformed, to reform it, one has to some extent break ties 
with the historical moment that provides the inspiration otherwise it is a simply straight 
imitation (likewise if we reverse the view: our contemporary prejudices, even if part of a so-
called newer perspective, are not simply being copied and pasted if they include a lesson from 
the past). Surely, the task of genealogy and a significant part of history in general, in helping 
us realise that what is now was not always so (or opening us to ‘the possibility of other pictures 
or perspectives’ (Owen, 2002, p. 221), is to enable us to ponder on the unimagined, not simply 
to imprison us into another historical psyche.   
This is a philosophical point, or to be more specific, a question that we answer by gazing back 
onto history from a philosophical framing. The need for a mode of evaluation returns, but not 
unchanged. We require something that can be sensitive to history’s insights whilst also not 
rejecting normative theory’s desire for an ideal. But can such unity of method be found in the 
debate between realism based on historical claims, and ideal theory dependant on abstract 
principles? 
As we have seen, normative theory has been accused by historical contextualists of being out 
of touch and not of use to the subject it wishes to analyse – politics – because of its attempt to 
find a space to forge the prior ‘ideal’. It is easy to see how this historical argument adds weight 
to a non-ideal theorist’s criticism of this value-laden theory: ‘Historical reflection, he argues 
[Guess], demonstrates that people seek power and crave security’. Thus, ‘Guess’s realism leads 
him to reject political theorists’ longstanding quest for justice and to embrace in its place the 
less ambitious, supposedly more realistic end of modus vivendi arrangements’ (Stears, 2011, 
p. 178) . Yet, for those who ally the historical contextual view with a realist standpoint there is 
an element of naivety perhaps equal to that of ideal theorists. Put simply, if you think that by 
looking at the everyday realities of politics and how humans ‘do behave’ as opposed to ‘how 
they should behave’ (Floyd, 2011, p. 58) is better because it is geared towards actually being 
relevant, and therefore based on the idea of having an impact, then is it not as equally optimistic 
to think that a more realist way of doing theory is actually going to influence politics, as the 
idea that one can find an ideal? There is also a little optimistic ambition, perhaps even 
sometimes fantasy, I think, in believing you are doing realism, if your basis for doing it is to 
improve on ideal theory’s apparent impotence or irrelevance outside of the academy9. This is 
not to completely deny the chances of such an achievement, only to be more self-aware of what 
criticisms regarding relevance may reveal when turned back on those who throw stones. 
In this sense then, it is perhaps better to make a secondary distinction to show the similarity 
between normative theory and realism, which will help us on taking steps to consolidate the 
apparent oppositions between them (even further breaking down the distinction between 
abstract and concrete): ideal theorists can be just as prone to thinking their principles are 
restricted to an academic discourse as they are vulnerable to believing their ideals are normative 
in the practical sense, and realism can be motivated by a belief in one’s own impact as much 
as it can lead to nihilistic conclusions. Those who retain a space however reduced, in both ideal 
and non-ideal theory, of the potential for an academic debate expanding outside of the 
academy, would therefore perhaps be better understood as two positions within a wider one: 
idealist theory. Realists may not be producing ideal theories, but they are practising an idealist 
                                                          
9 Despite this, I hope it is by now apparent to the reader that this paper tackles the issue of relevance and 
impact in regard to the form normative theory currently takes. How exactly normative theorising gets 
physically transmitted to beyond the academy is another project all in itself: at least here, I try to make sure it 
is methodologically prepared for that transition.  
form of theory if they pursue the historical realities based on a disdain for the irrelevance of 
ideal theory. Thus, all that remains in this dispute is a methodological disagreement, not an 
ideological one. In effect, where to begin our philosophical analyses – an ideal abstract space 
with significant distance to an event, or a ‘realist’ localised one close to it - and it is this which 
I seek to solve, by offering a narrative starting point which can perhaps satisfy this dispute, as 
well as historical concerns over truth.  
This is an approach where the origin and the destination come from each school of thought, 
bringing them together. One that begins with a keen eye on the context and emerges from the 
localised but does not have to end there: we may call a search for an ideal normative theory, 
but really when we rightly cast suspicions over its authority, it is simply a capacity to imagine 
a difference, alternative or deviation, and that is the only authority it can claim – not ‘unbiased 
intercourse’ (Strauss, 1988, pp. 76-77) on a ‘quest for universal knowledge’ (Strauss, 1988, p. 
11) , but the ability to conceptualise divergences. Is not this skill enhanced by, even found in, 
historical knowledge, not in the pretended ignorance of it? History might help us to understand 
similarities, but also realise (if not fully understand) hugely different points of view and 
practices. To ask oneself those ‘how could they?’ questions we often do at the beginning of our 
historical journeys, involves an attempt to imagine just that. We may feel that we cannot 
completely answer that, no matter how far we try to construct ourselves as a subject within a 
particular historical period, but the process of trying to do so is practiced, and in time, 
improved. So, echoing Williams point, we may not be able to completely empathise, but some 
are going to be better at it than others through practice. To try and take oneself out of one’s 
own time into another place, considered alien, is not so far from the powers of imagination it 
takes to conjure up a place removed of contingencies. In fact, we do this when we read stories 
– I will return to this. Likewise, abstract thought, no matter how adept one might be at it, cannot 
take us to a completely ahistorical, a-cultural place, for we still recognise ourselves hovering 
around at the edge of our attempts to think differently in order to realise we are thinking 
differently, but the attempts to do so inculcate an ability to be ‘better’ at it: to be further away 
from oneself, and therefore get a good view of our self, our preconceptions and stubbornness.  
The point here is that both conceptualising divergences and the capacity to imagine a space for 
less immediately contingent thought, must come after having trained ourselves in a deep 
knowledge of localised conditions, and in this way, we do not discount moral principles being 
formed from them. Equating the capability and even emergence of philosophical abstraction 
within a historical instruction does not deny political philosophy meaning or purpose: in fact, 
we could say it makes it more legitimate, for one has not applied an external, isolated 
perspective onto something, but found the abstraction, or relocation, after one has considered 
the actual event. Indeed, to once again return to Williams, if we did not acknowledge this 
capacity we would end up at the surely absurd claim that in our reproduction of localized 
prejudices, all reproductions are ‘equally local or perspectival, and that no contrast in this 
respect could conceivably be drawn from inside our thought’ (Williams, Philosophy as a 
Humanistic Discipline, 2000, p. 484) (emphasis added). I repeat this here (somewhat 
shamefully, for a third time) because it hits another important point. When we acknowledge 
that we cannot fully escape our contingent positions and reality when we abstract but achieve 
distance from it, we see western political philosophy as more of an aspect of a particular 
society, not necessarily a particular society of its own, or in the least it is not completely 
disconnected. In this mind-set then, it is not reproducing onto a culture, but within its own 
culture, for its task is to reflect on the very culture it exists within. It is, to put it clumsily, one 
of society’s self-reflections: a culture, within a culture. It therefore seems philosophy’s place 
should, at least to some extent, be involved in ‘impact’ with society beyond the academy.  
Historical critique of normative theory has done much to help us realise the more ridiculous 
assertions of objectivity and claims to transcend the historical we have seen in the past, which 
led to readings of Plato ‘as though it had come out in Mind last month’ (Williams, Philosophy 
as a Humanistic Discipline, 2000, p. 478), but let us not go too far in undermining this simple 
trait of imagination and relocation that we do share: both historians and abstract philosophers. 
It is this characteristic which has enabled all human artifice: regardless whether one believes it 
be for the purpose of power or improvement, and wary of the universal nature of this claim, I 
still say one cannot eradicate the existence of this feature of human life. If the first hunters can 
look at footprints and picture a mammoth, pick up a rock and see a spear tip in their minds eye, 
or suffer a forest fire and perceive of a previously unknown hearth, then ideas can be formed 
with a significant input of the innovative with the prejudiced also: and innovation, although 
inspired historically, often can involve something additional, summoned in the imagination. 
Here, in such a post-event abstract space, we can make small and modest claims to preserving 
the hope, but of course not certainty, that we may both come to understand something beyond 
our own local culture and context by beginning there, within a narrative, and that therefore 
such a place exists where the historical perspective is a little less totalising. Thus, in the 
meantime, we also rescue history from its own universal.  
New ideas are essentially how humans change their environments, from scavengers to hunters, 
nomadic to sedentary and so on: would it be so wrong then, to cite such examples as proof of 
historically-influenced but not historically-chained, innovative thinking in the history of ideas? 
In essence, the very first tool had to be an imagined thought first, seen within the cutting edge 
of a flint-rock, before it became a physical thing. Subsequent designs would then take from 
history and ever so subtly reshape. This is not to erase one’s localised environment completely, 
but to grow something from it and to some extent retain a capacity to imagine beyond it. Our 
feelings and perspectives in regard to historical events may well be rooted within our specific 
cultures – the emotions elicited from an ancient sailor as he looked out onto unconquered 
oceans probably are not directly comparable to the feelings of an astronaut as she gazes into 
space, or the outlook of a primeval hunter barely recognisable to a poacher – but the capacity10 
to imagine what lay before them is a shared trait, even if what they do imagine is wildly 
different. For the relevance of this paper, this means the ability to judge and evaluate something 
from a space of emerging standards that admittedly may only just be being conceived of, built 
from past echoes or incomplete, but are an attempt at a newer way of thinking all the same. It 
therefore also implies a possibility, however faint, for thinking beyond one’s own conditions. 
Without this, a flint-knife would never have changed shape, and is there really such a difference 
between imagining a new shape and why it might cut cleaner or fly faster, and thinking of a 
‘better’ theory11? Hence, we must depart from some of Williams’ more extreme claims that 
one can understand why ‘values and their implications’ take ‘certain forms here rather than 
others’ with ‘the help of history’ ‘only’ (Williams, Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, 
2000, p. 489) (emphasis added). Underneath this, is the basic principle that we can imagine 
ourselves in another situation, even as someone else, without fully losing our own identity. The 
historical then, is not always going to limit us to localised prejudices, but in fact can inspire us 
to try to think through them: to put ourselves in other’s shoes, and by doing so, realise how our 
shoes shape our own feet. This makes logical sense, if we think that localised prejudices are 
not always determined by the historical, but the geographical. What we understand is that to 
                                                          
10 Please note, dear reader, I use the word ‘capacity’: this denotes the possibility or likelihood of a shared 
process of imagination, not the definite, absolute possession of it. Imagination must exist as perhaps the most 
common trait amongst us, and so the closest thing to a universal, shared one, but there will always be degrees 
of capability regarding it, based on education, learning difficulties and environment. Not recognising it is 
simply to not recognise the reality of mental disabilities, and our continuing lack of knowledge about them. So 
for now, I will not say absolute possession of the imagining process, but the potential for it is absolute.  
11 One may make the point that it was in fact localised conditions which drove the need to change the shape of 
the knife, but this would be to prove my point: a mix of the localised, with the imaginative, to make something 
not a complete copy, but equally not a completely ahistorical thing. 
get to a divergent position, we need to in fact start from a context or narrative – the dagger is 
elicited from our mind’s eye through looking at what is local to us right at that moment - the 
knife - and what is behind us in our history – the flint-rock tool12. Thus, our imagination, relying 
upon a mix of current and past, here and somewhere else, needs to have those ingredients before 
it can hope to perceive something beyond it.  
Knowledge of a narrative then, historical, geographical or otherwise, does not limit us to that 
narrative, but in fact practices our ability to think beyond it when we reflect on the ‘truth’ 
within it, but equally, encourages us to ponder the potential partiality of our own position when 
scrutinizing that ‘truth’. Put simply, if we have to adapt to a more prescriptive normative theory, 
we must gaze through events to reach our normative ideal, not gaze onto them with a 
presupposition: we do this, by starting with a narrative: a ‘technique of enquiry’ (Bevir, What 
is Genealogy?, 2008, p. 275) over a principle. 
 
3.2 The ‘issue’ with homelessness, before the ‘issue’ with freedom – what it means to adapt 
a narrative starting point 
With Jeremy Waldron, abstract liberal principles have been used to help us rethink our 
approaches to homelessness, which involves presupposing a principle to highlight a problem. 
Whilst normative theory is done mostly in this way, in the environment of ‘impact’, this is 
likely to persist. So, in Waldron’s appeal to ‘abstract liberal principles’ regarding the homeless, 
although we see philosophy engaged with a ‘real life’ problem, the paper itself brushes over 
whether said principles could in fact be a cause of homelessness, because of the current 
normative method which to a large extent, must presuppose a principle, in order to even begin 
to attempt an ‘impact theory’. It is not problematic to offer a correcting normative value, but 
in my view, if we are to do so, we must engage in a deeper conceptual analysis of the value we 
offer up, in the context or problem it is to be argued within and applied to, which requires us 
to reject a method that involves presupposition of a principle and a ‘division of labour’. Instead 
then, to give an explicit counter-example, we could read the messages in public space – the 
legislation and the anti-homeless architecture - to help us rethink not only our approaches to 
homelessness and the current discourse which informs them, but the abstract principles we may 
utilise to ‘correct’ those approaches; for perhaps these abstract principles are also part of the 
                                                          
12 This is an abstract example to show how such a process would work, not a historical claim about daggers. 
problem’s cause. Waldron posited the blame mostly in communitarian narratives13, yet as we 
increasingly see changes in public space made in the interest of commercial activity and 
tourism, with community spaces turned to a ‘hybrid character” (Nissen, 2008, p. 1131), 
‘through which people transit, or act as consumers and displayers of their consumption’ 
(Parkinson, 2012, p. 7), we have to wonder whether or not ‘liberty from; absence of 
interference’ (Berlin, 1958, p. 11) is the new ‘issue’ causing homeless ‘unfreedom’ (Waldron, 
Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 1991, p. 306): negative freedom essentially assaulting 
negative freedom. Put simply, where the prioritisation of certain types of individuals, not the 
prioritisation of community values, is the new, dominant paradigm driving anti-homeless 
legislation and architecture. One cannot wonder this if one has placed that very principle as the 
moral starting point, or ‘answer-principle’, to resolve anti-homeless approaches, and that is not 
just a problem specific to that piece of work, but to the whole normative method. Conceptual 
analysis is immediately in danger of being forgotten, or divorced from the normative pursuit in 
normative theory.  
It should be noted however, that this apparent contextual origin does not claim to do away with 
prejudices and (ironically, being a genealogical approach) begin from a Straussian beliefs in 
objective origins or the ‘quest for universal knowledge’ (Strauss, 1988, p. 11): merely that our 
starting point is not a moral framework, but a commitment to a narrative, which will 
subsequently allow us to think with moral prejudice. Regarding this, prejudice in fact emerges 
as inchoate, in-narrative reflection, before being given full attention afterwards. 
What actually happens if we investigate something within our societies in this way? Again, to 
pursue the chosen example, we can problematize the current approach to homelessness - anti-
homeless legislation and hostile architecture - subsequently propose a concept (or concepts) 
which we think informs and drives it, in order to then problematize said concept. From this 
problematization, we can then build and offer principles of resolution – ‘new and challenging 
ways of thinking’ - which can produce different, more desirable approaches, in the ‘impact’ 
world of policy and legislation. This flexibility allows us to even propose an ideal and a 
modified version we think is more relevant to the specific issue, in the same piece of work.  
This is a normative theory sensitive to a historical perspective, even encouraging a genealogical 
approach, but one that can result in action-guiding after we have satisfied conceptual analysis 
of both the ‘problem-concept’ and potential ‘answer-principle’; not at the expense of the 
                                                          
13 Again, I would like to highlight that the homelessness articles were written in 1991 and 2000, so Waldron’s 
insight is not at fault, only perhaps his foresight was mistaken.  
normative suggestion, but in fact because of it. If the task in this act is one of unsettling then, 
we will not be reinforcing a presupposition when we come to the normative suggestion 
afterwards, but the emergence of a principle is possible. In this, I directly confront what even 
Nietzsche himself sees as the hardest part of problemitization - ‘Oh, pulling down is easy; but 
rebuilding!’ (Nietzsche F. , Fate and History: Thoughts, 2006, p. 13) - and this is the point, 
rebuilding should be part of problemitization, in my view. 
This is a challenging task, and if successful, speaks for itself. But, a quick point regarding this: 
In this approach, one should not expect to find completely new moral concepts. Instead, I 
merely hope to propose that the purpose of a narrative starting point is to enable us as theorists 
to highlight a problematic presupposition within our political culture (in the homeless example, 
anti-social behaviour) without needing to presuppose another (such as negative freedom and 
abstract liberal principles). Thus, should we simply arrive at some recognisable form of 
modified negative freedom or other well-rehearsed philosophical ideal, I would not consider 
that the approach proposed is pointless. Indeed, quite the opposite, for it will show that the 
normative principle as starting point is an unnecessary presupposition to frame our chosen 
‘issue’, when we can come to the same principle without presuming it. We ask then, not ‘what 
is the issue with freedom when seen in the context of homelessness?’, but ‘what is the issue 
with homelessness?’ 
I have hence tried to argue there is a qualitative difference, I think, between starting from a 
moral prejudice, and allowing it into your reflection. As the latter is read without explicit 
framing, the narrative produces the moral discussion, rather than the principle imposing itself 
upon the narrative. When the normative reflections arrive later on, so to speak, they do so more 
as ‘shows’ and not ‘tells’. Readers can approach them more cynically, for they already know 
the story, and are suspicious that somebody now tries to tell them what it means. It is easier to 
challenge claims made in such a way and makes the story closer to a real ‘conversation’ 
(Oakeshott, The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind, 1962, p. 489) arguably the 
essence of political theory. There is no potential impasse set up as there is in a normative 
framing, which can sometimes act as a filter for polemical scavengers: ‘Typically discussion 
will focus on the secondary ground that liberals largely share, such as different conceptions or 
discussions of rights’ (Haddock, 2011, p. 68). Thus, non-moral starting points can sometimes 
provide more inclusive frameworks for their normative discussions. A piece of work like 
Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’, for example, effectively starts by saying ‘if you do not subscribe 
to the principle of wealth redistribution there is little point in engaging you’: other positions 
and ideas are, in effect, ‘convicted in advance of irrelevance’ (Oakeshott, Rationalism in 
Politics and other essays, 1967, p. 202), and exactly ‘why these issues should be regarded as 
pressing is left to one side’ (Haddock, 2011, p. 68). It is in some ways similar with Waldron’s 
article, for it does not engage in questioning of the ‘principles’ as they are the starting point to 
the theorising: it presumes their perfectibility, and the reader’s investment in that perfectibility.  
Too much of this, I think, could be a problem for normative theory, especially in regard to 
accusations of a scholarly, moral authority. Of course, my aim is not to completely deny 
normative theorising performed with starting criteria, navigating actual experiences or ‘real-
life’ narratives where said criteria are found absent, only that conceptual analysis is at risk of 
not being applied to any ‘answer-principle’, which seems odd being that it is analysis of a 
societal presupposition which often attracts our normative gaze in the first place. What I am 
ultimately concerned with then, is philosophical reflection of concepts being effectively 
funnelled into a separate, more abstract project, if we consider ‘division of labour’ as the 
answer to presuppositions, and a decision between ‘evaluative’ and ‘prescriptive’ to be the 
reaction to the demands of ‘impact’. This is not just a concern in regard to academic integrity 
and rigour then, but also one in a more practical sense. In a world where political philosophy 
has to adapt to funding criteria which increasingly demands impact and utility of individual 
projects in order to acquire funding, deep examination of our conceptual presuppositions like 
liberty or freedom, in this kind of funding environment, are unlikely to receive the attention 
they need if not done alongside or within philosophical work which claims to be directly 
relevant to a ‘real life’ problem. As philosophers, we should be concerned that this might be 
even more the case for the next generation of theorists doing PhD’s. Therefore, if we have a 
method in our arsenal which builds our concepts and resolves our commitments to them from 
a narrative reflective of an existing ‘real world’ issue, rather than impose them onto it, I believe 
we can arrive at a more critical understanding of both the issue at hand and our normative 
principles: an understanding which is not insensitive to historical construction, realist 
commitments and the funding demands which reflect that, yet does not neglect the conceptual 
analysis required of philosophy and therefore does not make of itself a moral authority. In fact, 
it insists upon not avoiding this analysis or compartmentalising it into another ‘concepts’ or 
‘theories’ paper, but examining it, as we prescribe it. This is important, for although we do not 
want to lose ourselves to sky-gazing, considering the critical purchase of conceptual analysis 
and normative theory upon actual policy and legislation, we should remember that a normative 
theorist is not a civil servant: holding unjust laws or legislation to account is at the heart of 
transformative normative work, but so is remembering to reassess our conception of ‘unjust’, 
in the same piece of work. Therefore, in my view, carving out a space for a prescriptive style 
of philosophy, or ‘impact theory’, is possible, legitimate, and even desirable, as long as it 
remembers to reflect upon itself: a watchtower of philosophy, with the watchtower of history 
watching us.       
 
 
 
  
Epilogue 
A proposed form for the narrative starting point: Tellin’ stories - the framing of 
normative theory as literature and literary comment 
‘I suppose we’ll say that what both poets and prose writers say concerning the most important things about 
human beings is bad – that many happy men are unjust, and many wretched ones just, and that ding injustice is 
profitable if one gets away with it, but justice is someone else’s good and one’s own loss. We’ll forbid them to 
say such things and order them to sing and t tell tales about the opposites of these things'  
Book III (Plato, 1991, p. 70) 
‘I have grown weary of the poets, the old and the new: they all seem to me superficial and shallow sees. They 
have not thought deeply enough: therefore their feeling – has not plumbed the depths. A little voluptuousness 
and a little tedium: that is all their best ideas have ever amounted to. All their harp-jangling is to me so much 
coughing and puffing of phantoms; what have they ever known of the ardour of tones!’ (Nietzsche F. , Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, 1969, p. 151). 
But that I am forbid  
To tell the secrets of my prison-house,  
I could a tale unfold whose lightest word  
Would harrow up thy soul, freeze they young blood,  
Make thy two eyes, like stars, start from their spheres,  
Thy knotted and combined locks to part,  
And each particular hair to stand an end,  
Like quills upon the fretful porpentine.  
 Hamlet, Act I, scene v (Shakespeare, 1994) 
 
I have critiqued normative theory’s default method for starting essentially at the end: the 
correcting principle is something that should not be presumed, and needs to be arrived at, 
within the overall act of action guiding itself - hence, a narrative starting point. Here, then, I 
will offer one form or style of doing our new narrative starting point. It will hopefully include 
everything I have argued about gazing back onto a problem, drawing a principle from the issue 
rather than framing it with it, and conceptual analysis of that normative value at the same time 
as applying it. Historical realism has taught us to consider the context first, and pull our 
normative aims from it, so this is the method I propose: Tellin’ Stories: Philosophy as 
Literature and Literary Comment.  
It is clear, storytelling, although appearing in various different forms, is a reoccurring event in 
history, and pre-history for that matter. It is the purpose and use of telling stories that I am 
interested in here: in essence, to argue that only seeing the ‘error’ in the storyteller is the 
arrogance of the philosopher that should be overcome, so that it can be put to use in a form that 
the realist may be more accepting of, and our funding councils content with.  
Today, we are enmeshed in narrative: whether we are told a story in song and dance, ancestral 
legends, religious text, table-top roleplaying or TV drama, it is unlikely many of us go a day 
without having some kind of tale spun to us. We are therefore susceptible to its format, and 
that’s an issue, when we consider the choice of word; ‘Spun’. The normative theory academy 
has, I think, overlooked storytelling as a potential method, perhaps because of Platonic 
associations with guile, trickery and grandiloquence. Yet, I believe that in the days of ‘fake 
news’ and ‘alternative facts’, and the apparent ineffectiveness of actual facts in the face of such 
falsehoods, those who, amidst all the warnings not to, bravely step onto the stage of ‘impact’ 
and take on double-speaking career politicians, misleading media headlines and sky news 
soundbites must turn to storytelling, for it has power, persuasion and a critical cut to it that 
exposes. Moral and political truth, framed as it currently is in analytical approaches to 
normative theory, is failing to tackle the rhetorical, ever-elusive ‘truth’ of modern politics, for 
the confidence of moral and political truth has been weakened by history even as demands are 
made upon it by an impact agenda. This is a deadly position for the subject to be in. But, critique 
and action guiding framed within and from a storytelling narrative, I think, has more potential 
to carry the baton.  
Stories reveal things to us, they marvel in such moves, and carve deep into the core of 
something. For us now, storytelling can be the knife that slices the layers of post-truth, wrapped 
around each other like an onion, and when that blade unveils the empty nothing at the centre, 
perhaps we will cry. What we need then, is to couple this flare of storytelling, with a form of 
storytelling that does not lack authenticity, and dare I say it, a pursuit of ‘truth’. Even perhaps, 
that we simply need to remember that such storytelling does exist. What kind of storytelling 
could that be? What would (or does) it look like? 
Before we go there, let us briefly focus on what makes stories so compelling. If they do indeed 
reoccur, from ancient Greek plays to narrative-based computer games, why have cultures 
across time been so enamoured, one way or another, in stories? This is difficult to precisely pin 
down. For some, a story is a chance to escape, for others, less about escaping and more 
imagining. We might wish to get away from a particular event because it wearies us, or live in 
a world where something we do not have in our realities is present. The desire to empathise 
with a character holds no danger of making oneself vulnerable in that empathy, and similarly, 
experiencing heavy, dangerous emotions like loss and grief can be vicariously lived without 
the lasting damage that a real experience of such emotions can have. Stories have the power to 
immerse one in something else: perhaps even, into being somebody else with another 
standpoint, another truth. This immersion of the reader or viewer is far more effective at getting 
someone to shrug off the layers of their prejudice than patronising argument which just leads 
to further entrenchment despite ‘the facts’. In its current state, if utilised beyond academia for 
‘impact’, I feel that normative theory will rub anyone not involved in ‘the conversation’ up the 
wrong way and mould them into the opponent with a condescending, analytical mode of 
speech, irrespective of the indisputability of the ‘truth’ that is shown. This analytical method, 
with its dry manner, coupled with a kind of ‘I told you so’ reveal, relies on exposing somewhat 
condescendingly, the ignorance, perhaps even stupidity, of the reader, to them self. To borrow 
from Daniel Bell: ‘the author of an analytical philosophy essay tends to anticipate objections 
to her arguments’ then proceeds to ‘show why that critic would be misguided if he in fact 
argued that’ (Bell, 1993, p. 21). The reader is being lectured as soon as the first page is turned. 
Storytelling however, brings an audience to an argument through allowing them to escape from 
self, into another character. This escape from self, invites reflection, almost like a literary 
comment. Reflection on what things mean, what words mean, even eventual reflection of self 
before the return. We can in effect transgress our own taboos. Stories are often laced with guilt, 
and so an underlying concept of right and wrong. Some are involved with reinforcing this, 
others tearing it down with something new. Stories have consequences, results and moralise 
ideas. Stories can involve fables, warnings and demands. In a story, characters are antagonists 
as well as protagonists, and not so easily dismissed. Like in a Socratic dialogue, he ‘continually 
presses his objections’ (Bell, 1993, p. 21), but in a story, this can be shown through actions and 
inner-monologues also, so it becomes more immersive: a dialogue does not tell us a speaker’s 
internal struggle and emotions. Although better than the ‘being spoken at’ which is normative 
theory currently, we as readers stay as spectators in the conversation. A story pulls us into a 
point of view, which helps us consider our own from a distance; less entrenched. Yet if done 
well this is not mere propagandist mantra: as characters are imperfect, healthy suspicion often 
accompanies any concessions we may make. They are not perfectible god-like concepts, but in 
order to be convincing, they must actually make mistakes and second-guess themselves, and 
as the mode under which normative theory is delivered, this is less patronising. 
A story does not start at the end (even, when the end is used as a literary tool to begin, it 
becomes the start). A story does not finish once it is told. We think about it afterwards. We 
ponder on it, the meaning, the purpose, hidden messages. Some stories topple our world views, 
others merely make us laugh. Those that belong to the former, are forms of philosophy which 
have a roundabout way of getting us to think and re-examine. In its modern form, we tend to 
tell stories with something to aim for: a twist, a tense cliff-hanger, an epic finale. Were these 
things to come at the beginning of our story, we would already consider it half-told. If we are 
informed that the issue with homelessness is about negative freedom from the very title, then 
what else do we have to learn other than the argument, which we already know is coming? We 
miss out on our chance to hear the whole story, first. We want to comment on the presumption.  
Thus, after reading a story, we reflect upon it, but the best ones have many different framings. 
We look back on a good book for example and understand what happened from several 
different character’s perspectives, and by doing this, we might be able to get to a view with 
which we are most aligned, through giving the opposing ones full thought: a truth arrived at 
through at least experiencing the other perspective, and so realising the contingency of our own 
truth, whilst still holding onto it. Most of the time, I think, this does not involve presupposing 
one view over another; perhaps we mix a bit more of one to another. We are not after all dealing 
with scientific truths and so cannot completely discount moral views we are opposed to, which 
is where our ‘post-truth’ politics wheedles its way in, but, also, this does not mean we cannot 
criticise something as being built upon a deliberate falsehood: whether that ‘falsehood’ be an 
‘alternative fact’ that is being used to justify a moral view, or an actual fact being made to fit a 
perspective that it actually does not support. One can be against ‘post truth’ with one’s own 
truth, without needing to solidify it into the one and only absolute truth. Thus, we pass our truth 
on to someone else, and they add our version of events into their reflection, perhaps adding 
spoonful’s, perhaps only taking a pinch. My point is, is that this form of stories is one example 
of how the approach to normative theory that I have argued for can be realised, if one truly 
wants a conversation, and not just talking past each other: and that goes for ‘us’ within the 
academy, as well as ‘them’ without.  
It is clear then, with this and all of these potential reasons for stories, and all of these possible 
purposes, that storytelling has a place within philosophy and normative theory. Certain stories 
over the years have had philosophical content, which should alert us to storytelling as a 
potential form, or method, for delivering normative theory. From Tolstoy to Orwell stories 
have been linked to repression and oppression, and from More to Dickens the tale has given us 
idealist utopias and gritty realism. Want to understand Hobbes ‘state of nature’ in a storytelling 
guise? Watch post-apocalyptic TV series the Walking Dead or pick up that old school copy of 
Lord of the Flies. Game of Thrones is viewed by millions and gives us the Machiavellian Varys, 
the categorical Stark, and the Foucauldian ‘knowledge is power’ Littlefinger.  
True enough, if we look too hard we can find meaning in everything, subsequently stripping it 
from anything, so if looking for theory in computer games and TV entertainment waters down 
the discipline for you too much, philosophy’s own culture alone gives us the connection with 
‘Tellin’ Stories’. We read Socrates as a dialogue yes, but it is also a series of conversations 
within an overarching narrative, thereby being almost a story. Zarathustra, as Nietzsche’s 
intention to unveil his philosophy, is a story, a piece of literature, despite himself14. Works 
following it, such as the ‘Genealogy of Morals’ are merely subsequent reflections, or literary 
commentaries on it, and Rousseau of course, gave us the discourse before the instruction. 
Beyond our discipline of philosophy, we know stories are penetrated by political and 
philosophical thinking, but our discipline is also often invaded with story and narrative as a 
kind of truth telling, or ‘a revealing’. Tellin’ stories therefore has much to remind us regarding 
the mores of normative theory, but I also think, perhaps surprisingly, in its method also. 
To end this with a concise claim then: ‘Tellin’ Stories: Philosophy as literature and literary 
comment’ exists because history has taught us that although we cannot say our normative 
writings are truth, we can, in coming to the normative after a narrative, avoid the predicament 
of our current method: where we apply normative force from an abstract place prior to the 
story. Therefore, our normative action guiding may not be truth in itself, but to be seen as 
legitimate in terms of both funding demands and academic criticism, it can at least be attempts 
that are based on a true story. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Thus Spoke Zarathustra was one of my first forays into philosophy, and I was somewhat disappointed to find 
that the method of storytelling that delivered his thinking was sparse on the ground when it came to political 
theory.  
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